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REVERSE EXACTIONS
Gregory M. Stein*
ABSTRACT
When an owner applies for a permit to use property in a certain way, the gov-
ernment body with jurisdiction can either deny the permit, grant the permit outright,
or grant the permit subject to conditions. These conditions—known as “exactions”—
must meet two constitutional thresholds. First, there must be a close linkage between
a problem the owner’s project will create or exacerbate, such as increased traffic
caused by a proposed new shopping mall, and the exaction the government proposes,
such as the dedication of land for a new right-turn lane. Second, the condition the
government suggests must be proportional in magnitude to the problem. The ex-
action must meet this two-part test even if the applicant rejects the government’s
proposal and decides not to proceed.
The Supreme Court’s goal in adopting these rules was to ensure that the govern-
ment does not obtain for free property rights that it otherwise would have to pay for.
In other words, the test presupposes that the government is obtaining a benefit from
imposing the exaction. That presupposition is wrong for two reasons. First, a prop-
erly designed exaction does not create a benefit for anyone. Instead, it mitigates the
negative effects the applicant is imposing on its neighbors. Second, the mitigating
effects of the exaction inure to those neighbors and not to the government itself: the
government typically gains nothing, because the government is not acting in an
enterprise capacity. Rather, the government is serving as a referee, mediating be-
tween the competing property rights of an applicant that seeks to develop its land
and members of the broader community who do not want their own property rights
impaired by a neighbor’s intensified use. If a government agency fears takings lia-
bility under this stringent test and decides to grant the permit unconditionally or to
impose conditions that are too weak, it is striking an unfair balance between these
competing property rights and allowing the applicant to impose external costs on its
neighbors. The current test, in short, tips the scales in favor of applicants by pushing
government bodies toward proposing weak or no conditions.
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This Article argues that members of the broader community should be permitted
to counter this inequity by bringing reverse exaction claims, challenging particular
government impositions as insufficient to offset the negative effects of an applicant’s
proposed development. Like traditional exaction claims brought by permit appli-
cants, these reverse claims would succeed or fail based on the Court’s two existing
criteria, namely (1) the degree of linkage between the problem and the condition the
government exacted and (2) the magnitude of the condition. This claim, however,
would be viewed from the opposite perspective. The neighbors would argue that the
government’s granting of consent with inadequate conditions attached effects a com-
pensable taking of their own property rights. In a traditional exaction claim, the
wronged landowner receives compensation that is ultimately paid by the beneficiaries
of the government’s over-exaction, typically taxpayers; here, the wronged neighbors
would be compensated from funds the government would raise from the applicant
that received a permit without initially paying the full cost of its own externalities.
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s exactions test is designed to balance the rights of an ap-
plicant seeking to intensify its use of land against the rights of a broader community
that does not wish to be burdened with spillover effects resulting from that intensi-
fied usage.1 However, the Court’s three exaction decisions accomplish this goal only
partially while concurrently placing burdens and risks on the government body.2
Governments face significant liability if they are found to have exacted too much.3
Liability concerns pressure governments either to grant too many permits outright
or to impose permit conditions that are too limited.4 As a result, some applicants do
not pay the full cost of their increased use, while some neighbors bear costs that
should more appropriately be shouldered by the party that caused them.5
This problem can arise in numerous different ways. A retail establishment that
expands its building and parking area, for example, may cause some of the storm-
water that previously absorbed into the ground on site to flow instead onto neighbor-
ing property, increasing the risk of flooding nearby.6 It would be entirely appropriate
for the government to require the applicant to address this problem by conditioning
1 As of 2013, all nine Justices—eight of whom are still on the Court as of this writing—
agreed. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2595 (2013); id.
at 2604–05 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
2 See id. at 2595 (majority opinion); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan
v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
3 See, e.g., Nollan, 483 U.S. 825.
4 This Article uses the term “permit” loosely, with the intention of including government
issuance of a building permit, approval of a subdivision plat, approval under environmental
or historic preservation laws, and even rezonings. While these and similar actions differ in
important ways, in all cases an applicant needs the government’s approval before it can pro-
ceed. The relevant common feature is that the government has the discretion to refuse the
permit for legitimate reasons. Thus, the term “permit,” as used here, is not meant to include
purely ministerial actions, such as issuing a building permit upon confirmation that an ap-
plicant is licensed or has procured the minimum required insurance.
5 This Article uses the term “neighbors” broadly, to include any member of the commu-
nity who might be affected by pollution, degradation of ground water, and other similar
effects of intensified land use in the general vicinity. The term as used here is not limited to
parties whose land is immediately adjacent to that of the permit applicant. It is possible that
a court might apply rigorous standing requirements to the types of claims proposed in this
Article, such as those required by Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), in which the Su-
preme Court required the plaintiffs to establish clearly that they were the proper parties to
seek judicial resolution of a dispute. Note, however, that the Warth plaintiffs did not assert
that the government had taken their property without compensation. Id. at 493. If a court
were to apply Warth to the arguments discussed below, then the term “neighbors” might need
to be restricted to residents of the jurisdiction that imposes the exaction and might preclude
residents of nearby jurisdictions from proceeding.
6 This hypothetical loosely tracks the facts of Dolan, 512 U.S. at 377–83.
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its approval on the applicant’s regrading of its own land and creation of a detention
pond.7 The exaction protects the neighbors’ property rights against unwelcome in-
cursion by the applicant.8 The applicant enjoys the economic benefits of its enlarged
establishment but must internalize the costs its project would otherwise shift to nearby
property owners.9
Part I reviews this doctrinal problem by exploring the three Supreme Court cases
to address the issue.10 The latest case sets forth, in exceptionally clear language:
(1) what the problem is; (2) how the Court believes that its doctrine addresses the
issue fairly; and (3) the dissent’s prediction of the likely fallout of inappropriately
tilting the playing field toward applicants.
Part II explains the central fallacy of the Court’s opinions, namely its assump-
tion that government bodies benefit personally by imposing exactions on applicants.
This Part demonstrates that the objective of an exaction is not for the government
to enrich itself by acquiring a property right for its own use.11 Rather, the govern-
ment seeks to ensure that other stakeholders who will suffer from the applicant’s
intensification in use do not bear an unfair portion of the resulting costs.12 The goal
of an exaction is to internalize the applicant’s externalities, thereby ensuring that the
party causing a new problem pays all the expenses of remediating it rather than
shifting those expenses to owners nearby.13 In short, the government is acting as a
referee and not as an entrepreneur.14
7 See id. at 382.
8 See id.
9 See Vicki Been, Impact Fees and Housing Affordability, 8 CITYSCAPE: J. POL’Y DEV.
& RES. 139, 143 (2005) (discussing how exactions encourage efficiency by forcing the
developer to internalize the full cost of its development).
10 Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013); Dolan, 512 U.S.
374; Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
11 See infra Part II.
12 See infra Part II.
13 See Been, supra note 9, at 143:
[B]y requiring the developer and its customers to pay to mitigate the
negative effects a development may have on a neighborhood, such as
increased traffic congestion, noise, and environmental degradation, im-
pact fees [a type of exaction] . . . may encourage efficiency by making
the developer and its customers internalize the full costs of the harms
that the development causes.
14 See Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 67 (1964):
The precise rule to be applied is this: when an individual or limited
group in society sustains a detriment to legally acquired existing eco-
nomic values as a consequence of government activity which enhances
the economic value of some governmental enterprise, then the act is a
taking, and compensation is constitutionally required; but when the
challenged act is an improvement of the public condition through reso-
lution of conflict within the private sector of the society, compensation
is not constitutionally required.
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Part III proposes two responses. The more radical and less likely response is for
the Court to concede that it needs to re-examine its exaction doctrine. The more
realistic recommendation assumes that these cases will remain good law but sug-
gests that the Court acknowledge that its strict exaction standards are a balancing
device intended to protect not only disgruntled land use applicants, but also mem-
bers of the broader community who feel blindsided.15 Exactions, which are intended
to be an equalizing device, can harm the applicant by being too invasive or the
broader public by being insufficiently corrective.16 Under this second approach, the
Court would recognize reverse exaction claims by which members of the commu-
nity may challenge exactions as failing the nexus and proportionality tests and
recover compensation, just as unhappy applicants may do under existing doctrine.17
If the government is to serve as referee, courts must provide legal recourse to both
contestants.
Cf. Joshua A. Decker, Markets in Everything and Another View of the Cathedral: Religious
Freedom and Coasian Bargaining, 26 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 485 (2015) (recognizing that
some free exercise claims are actually disputes between individuals rather than between an
individual and the government).
15 See John A. Lovett, Property and Radically Changed Circumstances, 74 TENN. L. REV.
463, 476 (2007) (“[P]roperty law is designed to create stable environments in which people
can exercise predictable control over the tangible and intangible objects of value in their
world . . . .”); cf. Nestor M. Davidson, Property’s Morale, 110 MICH. L. REV. 437, 442–43
(2011) (discussing how unexpected changes in property rules can both increase the demoraliza-
tion of those who want their expectations protected and comfort those who desire flexibility).
16 See Lee Anne Fennell, Hard Bargains and Real Steals: Land Use Exactions Revisited,
86 IOWA L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2000) (arguing that tight restrictions on regulatory bargains harm
landowners and communities).
17 At least one commentator has used the term “reverse exactions” previously, but in an
entirely different context. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Public-Use Question as a Takings
Problem, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 934, 956–57 (2003) (drawing a parallel between economic
development public use takings by municipalities and traditional exactions in the sense that
the former involve imposing small burdens—in the form of incremental individual expenses
for compensation awards—on numerous local taxpayers).
Others have noted the one-sidedness of exactions doctrine and argued for greater
reciprocity. See, e.g., Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking
the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 504–06 (1991) (noting
the possibility of under-regulation); Fennell, supra note 16, at 40–41 (observing that claims
by neighbors who are harmed are “theoretically possible,” but concluding that such an
approach would be both under- and over-inclusive); Mark Fenster, Takings Formalism and
Regulatory Formulas: Exactions and the Consequences of Clarity, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 609,
655–56, 655 n.228 (2004) (suggesting that the solution may lie in state law); see also John
D. Echeverria, The Costs of Koontz, 39 VT. L. REV. 573 (2015) (focusing on the separation
of powers, federalism, and efficiency costs of Koontz); cf. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY
TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 349–50 (1995) (asking whether such reciprocity
might be undemocratic).
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I. HOW DID WE GET HERE?
In Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District,18 the Supreme Court
thoroughly reviewed the reasons government bodies impose conditions on permits
and the problems these exactions can create.19 Although the Court was divided on the
two main issues the case addressed, the Justices seemed largely to agree on these
foundational points.20 Justice Alito’s opinion for the five-member majority begins
by summarizing the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, noting that this doctrine
“vindicates the Constitution’s enumerated rights by preventing the government from
coercing people into giving them up.”21
Land use permitting agencies must balance two conflicting truths. On the one
hand, “land-use permit applicants are especially vulnerable to the type of coercion
that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine prohibits because the government often
has broad discretion to deny a permit that is worth far more than property it would
like to take.”22 Balanced against this concern is the competing reality that “many pro-
posed land uses threaten to impose costs on the public that dedications of property
can offset.”23 Applicants that receive permits may benefit in part by imposing ex-
ternal costs on unwilling neighbors. Under existing doctrine, “[i]nsisting that
landowners internalize the negative externalities of their conduct is a hallmark of
responsible land-use policy, and we have long sustained such regulations against
constitutional attack.”24 However, government bodies must not use this exaction
power coercively.25 The dissent agrees, summarizing the prior case law as “designed
to curb governments from using their power over land-use permitting to extract for
free what the Takings Clause would otherwise require them to pay for.”26
18 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013).
19 Exactions are to be distinguished from community benefits agreements (“CBAs”).
CBAs are negotiated between permit applicants and community groups with no government
participation; thus, due process and takings concerns do not arise. Edward W. De Barbieri,
Do Community Benefits Agreements Benefit Communities?, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1773, 1776
(2016). By contrast, exactions are negotiated between permit applicants and government bodies.
20 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2595; id. at 2604–05 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
21 Id. at 2594 (majority opinion).
22 Id.
23 Id. at 2595.
24 Id. (citing Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)). Exactions
also prevent applicants from free-riding on infrastructure improvements that have previously
been paid for by others. See Daniel D. Barnhizer, Givings Recapture: Funding Public Acqui-
sition of Private Property Interests on the Coasts, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 295, 358 (2003)
(“[E]xactions and impact fees can be viewed not only as a means of forcing developers to
compensate the community for the new burdens imposed by the development, but also as a
rough means of recapturing givings arising from past community investments that the devel-
oper seeks to exploit.”).
25 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2595.
26 Id. at 2612 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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To strike this difficult balance, the Court had previously required, in Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission,27 that any government condition bear an “essential
nexus” to the problem it seeks to offset.28 Under this test, a condition must serve the
same purpose a permit denial would have.29 In short, there must be a “close . . . ‘fit’
between the condition and the burden.”30
The Court added a second prong to this exaction test, focusing on the scale of
the exaction, in Dolan v. City of Tigard.31 Not only must there be an adequate cause-
and-effect relationship between the exaction and the externality it seeks to mitigate
under Nollan, but the exaction also must not be excessive in its magnitude.32 Under
this “rough proportionality” test, “[n]o precise mathematical calculation is required,
but the city must make some sort of individualized determination that the required
dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed develop-
ment.”33 Although the Court has agreed on the two-part test it will apply, that test
leaves numerous questions open, only some of which the Court has since answered.34
For example, the Court later held that this test applies to an applicant that brings a
claim after rejecting the exaction, even though it is unclear whether such an appli-
cant has actually relinquished anything.35
II. THE CENTRAL FALLACY OF THE COURT’S EXACTION DOCTRINE
A. The Court’s Incorrect Assumption that Governments Are Acting
as Entrepreneurs
The central flaw of these cases is the Court’s assumption that government bodies
that impose excessive exactions seek to benefit themselves unjustifiably at the ex-
pense of applicants.36 The Court views land use bodies as nefarious actors that exploit
property owners in need of administrative consent by imposing unrelated conditions
that enrich themselves improperly.37
27 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
28 Id. at 837.
29 Id. at 836–37 (“If a prohibition designed to accomplish [a proper] purpose would be
a legitimate exercise of the police power rather than a taking, it would be strange to conclude
that providing the owner an alternative to that prohibition which accomplishes the same
purpose is not.”).
30 Id. at 838. More precisely, the Court held that any exaction must substantially advance
a legitimate state interest. Id. at 834–35; see also infra Section III.B.1.
31 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
32 Id. at 391.
33 Id.; see also infra Section III.B.2.
34 The Court has since ratified its exaction test unanimously. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A.
Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 547–48 (2005) (unanimous opinion).
35 Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013).
36 See id. at 2596 (calling respondent’s proposed exaction “[e]xtortionate” and “coercive”);
see also Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
37 See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2596.
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Under this view, the government is just another opportunistic, profit-seeking prop-
erty owner. Moreover, while a developer can always seek a different lender or purchase
building materials and labor from competing vendors or workers, public agencies have
a monopoly over permits within their municipal borders.38 A developer must cooperate
with the public bodies that control the issuance of the permits it needs and ultimately
must either accept the best deal it can get from the government or abandon its project.39
Worse still, because the government is the government, it has the power to
manufacture opportunities for these occasions to arise.40 Governments may adopt
excessive permitting requirements to increase the likelihood that a desperate appli-
cant later will cough up the necessary concessions rather than forsaking the ability
to use its property.41 Or governments can build in discretionary standards that allow
them the wiggle room needed to wring out compromises.42 Ironically, while Koontz
treats government like a profit-maximizing property owner, it expresses no concerns
about actual private property owners seeking to develop their real estate in ways that
might harm their neighbors.43 The government might overreach much like a private
real estate developer would, but an actual real estate developer apparently will not.
38 See FISCHEL, supra note 17, at 271 (“The most distinct characteristics of local gov-
ernments are the lack of alternative decision-making arrangements . . . and the immobility
of certain assets within their borders.”).
39 This is not quite true, as property owners can always “vote with their feet” and choose
more owner-friendly jurisdictions. See Been, supra note 17, at 514–28 (discussing evidence
supporting and contradicting this hypothesis). Real estate, however, is an immobile asset that
is cumbersome to liquidate, and someone will end up owning the property in the more heavily
restricted jurisdiction. The owner that decides to exit the jurisdiction will take a loss when
it sells the restricted property to a successor that knows how difficult it will be to use and
factors that into the price it is willing to pay.
40 Professor Fischel recognized this point long ago. FISCHEL, supra note 17, at 342 (“The
communities that collect exactions are the ones that have the most regulations. If developers
could do projects ‘as of right,’ the community would have almost no leverage to exact any
payment beyond property taxes.”).
41 Fenster, supra note 17, at 634 (“In the absence of judicial intervention, the [Nollan]
Court assumed, municipalities would increase their bargaining leverage by producing more
stringent land use regulations, only to waive them in exchange for even more beneficial, un-
related amenities.” (footnote omitted)); see also Fennell, supra note 16, at 15–16 (“If the
government can make rules costlessly, it can sell violation rights to members of the populace
for pure profit.” (footnote omitted)).
42 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2595 (“So long as the building permit is more valuable than any
just compensation the owner could hope to receive for the right-of-way, the owner is likely
to accede to the government’s demand, no matter how unreasonable.”).
43 See generally Gregory M. Stein, David L. Callies & Brian Rider, Stealing Your
Property or Paying You for Obeying the Law? Takings Exactions After Koontz v. St. Johns
River Water Management District, THE ACREL PAPERS 283, 300–02 (Spring 2014) (dis-
cussing the Court’s distrust of government actors and noting that “the Court expresses no
corresponding concern that property owners, too, may overreach.” (footnote omitted)).
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B. The Risks of Improper Government Behavior Are Low in the Exaction Setting
This Article does not argue that land use agencies always act appropriately.
Landowners and their lawyers can cite numerous cases in which government bodies
behaved improperly—perhaps in the ways described in the previous section44—in
an effort to increase their institutional wealth and power.45 The same can be said for
some of the individuals who act on behalf of those bodies: land use officials are
modestly paid civil servants who serve as gatekeepers for valuable permits real
estate developers must obtain before they can proceed.46 Given the potential profits
those developers might earn, it is not surprising that they sometimes offer—and that
some officials are willing to accept—inappropriate personal benefits in exchange for
those permits.47 The discretionary nature of the land use permitting process gener-
ates the possibility of everything from minor mischief to out-and-out corruption, and
the fairly typical behavior seen in cases such as Koontz falls far short of that type of
intentional malfeasance.48
But the exaction setting inherently includes checks that greatly reduce the
likelihood of this type of calculated overreaching. Exactions may be one of the more
mystifying parts of an already murky land use process, but they are a part in which
government misconduct is less likely to take place. Most importantly, exactions
arise not when the government seeks to act on its own initiative but rather when the
government responds to a request initiated by a private actor.49 These typically are
not settings in which the government has pre-existing plans to acquire land for a
specific government purpose.50 The government is not trying to assemble a coherent
44 See supra Section II.A.
45 See, e.g., Been, supra note 17, at 483–86 (summarizing the potential threats that ex-
actions may produce).
46 See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON ET AL., LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS
332–36 (4th ed. 2013) (discussing the prevalence of corruption in the land use control
system).
47 See id.; Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Hidden Function of Takings Com-
pensation, 96 VA. L. REV. 1673, 1694 (2010) (“[I]n most contexts, even thoroughly corrupt
politicians will be unable to or unwilling to take undisguised cash payments. Rather, corrupt
politicians will seek to get paid indirectly. The payments may take a variety of forms, such
as campaign contributions, business contracts with associates of the politician, and so forth.”).
48 For a discussion of the distance between the theoretical benefits of exactions and the
ways in which they are employed on the ground, see Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 47,
at 1675 (“[T]he desirability of the takings power critically depends on the law’s ability to
negate the self-interest of politicians and thereby align their interests with those of the public
at large.”); Mark Fenster, Regulating Land Use in a Constitutional Shadow: The Institutional
Contexts of Exactions, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 729, 737–40 (2007).
49 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 379 (1994) (describing the application
process for the Dolans).
50 Occasionally, an applicant seeks to develop land for which the government does hap-
pen to have particular plans. The California Coastal Commission exacted an easement from
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parcel, as it might be if it were building a new school or library. It is merely re-
sponding to unpredictable requests from assorted owners whenever they happen to
cross the transom. The scattershot nature of the application process makes it unlikely
that government bodies can use the exaction power to assemble coherent parcels of
property.51 Granted, government bodies may use their natural leverage improperly
and may adopt regulations that increase the chances that they will enjoy this type of
leverage.52 But the government has too little control over what applicants might do
to engage in the type of pre-planned extortion the Court’s majority plainly fears.53
Nor are these settings in which the government is just another entrepreneurial
market actor out to make as much of a buck as it can. Exactions commonly arise in
settings in which the government itself receives no benefit from the applicant, and
the government often assumes significant liabilities after exacting property interests.54
Although the government lost in Dolan,55 the facts in that case are fairly typical of
those in which a government exaction seeks to protect the public while allowing the
applicant to proceed.56
The Dolans wanted to expand a plumbing supply store in a crowded area prone
to flooding.57 The plans included more than doubling the size of the store, increasing
the size of the parking lot, and paving the previously gravel lot;58 these modifications
would indisputably increase water runoff into a creek that ran along the property and
were specifically aimed at adding to store traffic.59 The City of Tigard proposed land
dedications that would allow for increased absorption of ground water and the ex-
pansion of a bicycle path.60 These responses were plainly designed to mitigate the
the Nollans similar to 43 others it had already exacted along one stretch of beach. Nollan v.
Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 829 (1987). Rather than condemning and paying for the
easement, as it otherwise would have had to do, the Commission tried to exact the same
easement free of charge in exchange for granting the Nollans their permit, or so the Court
believed. Id. at 831. Governments are unlikely to plan this type of behavior, since they ordi-
narily do not know when owners will submit applications. The Commission just got lucky.
51 Cf. Hillcrest Property, LLP v. Pasco County, 939 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1242 (M.D. Fla.
2013), vacated on other grounds, 754 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2014) (noting, in a due process
case, that “to avoid the nettlesome payment of ‘just compensation,’ the Ordinance empowers
Pasco County to purposefully leverage the permitting power to compel a landowner to dedi-
cate land encroached by a transportation corridor. In Pasco County, if there is no free dedication,
there is no permit.”). The district court described this type of behavior as “not yet common.” Id.
52 See Stein, Callies & Rider, supra note 43, at 300–02 (discussing the Court’s distrust
of government officials but not property owners).
53 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
54 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
55 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
56 See id. at 379.
57 See id.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 387.
60 Id. at 379–80.
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negative effects the applicants’ expanded store would have on neighbors and the
general public.61 The Court found these exactions to meet the Nollan essential nexus
standard,62 as the city plainly was trying to do.63 The Court’s objection was that the
city demanded more than it needed to achieve these results, a second component of
the exaction test that the Court had not mentioned in Nollan.64
Although a government agency might acquire facilities such as these in fee sim-
ple or at least hold an easement, that government receives no direct benefit from the
land, while incurring significant costs.65 The Dolans formulated their plan with the
specific goal of swelling the number of store patrons, and Tigard’s exactions were
designed to offset the resulting increases in road traffic and floodwater runoff.66 The
city undoubtedly thought it more appropriate for the Dolans to pay the remediation
costs generated by their own project, as opposed to Tigard’s taxpayers.67 This ap-
proach is more fair to the public and spares the city from having to raise taxes or
user fees, spend reserves set aside for future emergencies, or reallocate funds ear-
marked for other municipal needs. The city garners no benefit from this land, as it
would if it were building a new library. It is simply preventing public conditions
from worsening.
Moreover, bicycle trails and flood runoff zones are hardly cost-free propositions
for the city, which probably would have been better off financially by simply reject-
ing the Dolans’ application.68 The government will have to purchase or exact other
property to complete the two public projects.69 It will need to pave and maintain the
bicycle path and ensure that the floodway remains free of obstructions.70 The gov-
ernment will have to bear all the security costs and tort liabilities that arise from
projects such as these while foregoing some of the real estate taxes the Dolans
61 Id.
62 Id. at 387–88.
63 Id. at 387.
64 Id. at 386.
65 See id. at 392–95; id. at 404 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
66 Id. at 379–82 (majority opinion).
67 Professor Sax noted early on the unfairness of requiring taxpayers to pick up the tab
when the government is acting to resolve disagreements between neighboring landowners:
“Requiring the public to pay for the costs generated by every situation of conflicting uses
between property owners would wildly expand the reach of the compensation provision of
the Constitution . . . .” Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE
L.J. 149, 153 (1971). Such a requirement also impairs sensible land use planning. Id. at 161
(“To bring under the takings clause governmental restrictions designed to mediate between
conflicting interests is to introduce a doctrinal rigidity inconsistent with the kind of planning
essential to optimal resource allocation.”).
68 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 404 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
69 See Timothy M. Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future, 64 BAYLOR L. REV. 511, 527–28
(2012) (addressing issues of land assembly).
70 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 404 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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previously paid.71 It will have to field complaints, and perhaps even defend against
litigation, from unhappy citizens every time there is a major traffic jam or a heavy
rainstorm. In undertaking these public projects—necessitated in part by the Dolans’
desire to enrich themselves at the community’s expense—it is embarking on civic
ventures that will create extensive ongoing obligations and from which it receives
no institutional benefit beyond its typical function of serving the public.72 Some
government bodies that foresee these long-term, costly tasks would simply deny the
Dolans’ permit request outright, rejections unlikely to lead to takings liability under
the more flexible Penn Central standard.73 It is hard to imagine that governments
will scheme to use exactions as a way to expand their revenues or land holdings
when, in many cases, these governments would be better off simply denying these
controversial, costly, and often unanticipated permit requests.74
Even in cases in which it appears that a government entity receives some in-
dividualized benefit, that benefit is often illusory. Inclusionary zoning offers a useful
example.75 At first glance, an inclusionary zoning scheme (in which, for example, a
developer is legislatively required to include a certain number of affordable units before
receiving a permit to build a market-rate residential project) seems to relieve govern-
ment of the need to build the affordable units itself.76 This example features some,
but not all, of the attributes of an exaction.77 But it is apparent that the government’s
71 See id.
72 Tigard, for example, “would bear the cost of maintaining a landscaped buffer between
the dedicated area and the new store.” Id. at 380 (majority opinion).
73 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (applying, when de-
termining whether a regulatory taking has occurred, a three-part balancing test that takes into
consideration the economic impact on the claimant, the extent to which regulation has inter-
fered with investment-backed expectations, and the nature of the government action); see also
James E. Krier & Stewart E. Sterk, An Empirical Study of Implicit Takings, 58 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 35, 64 (2016) (examining implicit takings cases in the lower courts, finding a low
rate of success on Penn Central claims, and asking, “Why do lawyers persist in litigating
these cases to judicial decision when the prospect of success is so low?”); id. at 88 (“[I]n state
court practice, relegation to ad hoc adjudication has marked the death knell for a takings claim.”).
74 Professor Fennell describes this doctrinal anomaly as “the worst of both worlds.”
Fennell, supra note 16, at 4. She notes, “It leaves landowners exposed to excessive land use
regulation while constricting their ability to bargain for regulatory adjustments.” Id. at 4–5;
see also Lee Anne Fennell & Eduardo M. Peñalver, Exactions Creep, 2013 SUP. CT. REV.
287, 300 (“[D]efining the Court’s exactions test in terms of bargaining alone risks allowing
the test to slip its bonds and become the basis for wide-ranging heightened judicial scrutiny
of land use regulation generally.”).
75 See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
76 See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
77 It remains to be seen whether the Court will treat inclusionary zoning, typically mandated
by statute, in the same manner as it treats exaction cases, which arise following individual-
ized administrative responses to permit requests. The same question arises with respect to
incentive zoning, under which a developer receives a statutory bonus in exchange for provid-
ing a public service such as open space or day-care facilities. See, e.g., Cal. Bldg. Indus.
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role remains that of a mediator and not an entrepreneur. By increasing the number
of market-rate units, the developer is contributing to an affordability problem and
furthering a need for schools, firefighters, police officers, mass transit, and open
space.78 A legislature might reasonably conclude that this developer needs to con-
struct subsidized units or amenities as a means of offsetting the impact its project
will have on neighborhood affordability and quality of life.79
In cases such as Dolan, an applicant chooses to enrich itself in a way that may
harm its neighbors.80 No one should be surprised or troubled by an owner’s procliv-
ity to earn more money from its real estate. The tougher question, though, is who
should pay the increased monetary and in-kind public costs this intensification in use
will generate. There is no reason why applicants should foist on unwilling neighbors
the costs of remediating these problems, including the direct expense of responding
to new civic problems, the indirect expense of reduced property values nearby and
the resulting drop in assessed valuation, or the in-kind cost of a lower quality of life
than the government deems suitable.81 Instead of simply granting or denying the
request, the City of Tigard catered to the Dolans’ desires by pursuing the thornier
option of finding a palatable middle ground and making the Dolans pay for the
problems they would create.82 This is hardly the type of governmental extortion the
Koontz Court would decry two decades later.83
C. Exactions Often Are Wise, Middle-Ground Compromises
Exactions are compromises proposed by a governmental body to mediate between
incompatible uses of adjacent or nearby land.84 Ideally, they are sensible, incremental
Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 351 P.3d 974, 979 (Cal. 2015) (finding such fees not to be
exactions); 616 Croft Ave., LLC v. City of West Hollywood, 207 Cal. Rptr. 3d 729, 732 (Ct.
App. 2016) (finding similar impositions not to be exactions), cert. denied, 2017 WL 1064331
(Oct. 30, 2017).
78 For a discussion of the degree to which privately owned public open space require-
ments accomplish their goals, see Sarah Schindler, The “Publicization” of Private Space,
103 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2018).
79 See id.
80 See 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
81 See, e.g., Hallmark Inns & Resorts, Inc. v. City of Lake Oswego, 88 P.3d 284, 293 (Or.
Ct. App. 2004) (“[W]ithout the pathway, the development would impede the flow of pedes-
trian and bicycle traffic from an adjoining residential area to an adjoining shopping center.
The pathway removes that impediment. The need for the pathway is directly related to the
development itself . . . .”).
82 See Dolan, 512 U.S. 374.
83 See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013).
84 See Lisa Grow Sun & Brigham Daniels, Externality Entrepreneurism, 50 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 321, 333 (2016) (“[T]he externality entrepreneur can choose what counts as an
‘externality’ so long as she can successfully persuade others of that understanding.”); John
A. Lovett, The Symmetry Heuristic: American Property Theory’s Creative Virtue or Irresistible
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compromises that are more beneficial overall than either a denial or an unconditional
grant: the applicant can proceed but must offset some of the negative consequences its
change in use will force others to bear.85 The applicant ends up better off—though
not as well off as it had hoped—by receiving a valuable permit and undergoing the
more modest expense of mitigating the burden it imposes on others.86 The neighbors
end up no worse off, thanks to the layer of protection the government permitting pro-
cess provides.87 Thus the Koontz Court’s presupposition of rogue government agen-
cies that must be reined in through strict judicial oversight is often off the mark, and
it places courts in the position of having to umpire numerous local, fact-intensive land
use battles.88
Curse? (forthcoming 2017) (on file with author) (noting that judges do not merely enforce
rights and liberties “but rather . . . mediate relationships between individuals”).
Note that the “adjacency” of the incompatibility can be physical, temporal, or both. See
Bruce R. Huber, Temporal Spillovers, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Klaus
Mathis, ed.) (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 2), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2820730 (dis-
cussing “uses of land that deliver present benefits but entail residual risks after the cessation
of the beneficial use”); J. Peter Byrne & Kathryn A. Zyla, Climate Exactions, 75 MD. L. REV.
758, 777 (2016) (“Regulators should account for ways that climate change will affect the cur-
rently calculated impacts (e.g., recreation) of a development in the future, as well as how the
project may exacerbate future risks of climate change impacts to neighboring properties.”).
85 See generally Koontz, 133 S.Ct. 2586.
86 If the burden of the project on others exceeds the benefit to the landowners, then a
properly calculated exaction will make the project undesirable to the applicant, which will
not proceed. This is a classic case in which internalizing an externality prevents a project that
should not advance from advancing—the applicant benefits less than the community as a
whole will suffer. In fact, if the applicant also owned the burdened parcel, it would not move
forward with the project because its personal costs would exceed its benefits. See Sax, supra
note 67, at 172 (observing how solitary owners naturally internalize their own costs); cf.
Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 345, 402 (2003) (“When ineffi-
cient takings occur, the wrongdoer might usefully be identified as the constituency that
benefits from the taking while externalizing the costs onto other members of the community.
Presumably, it is the political support of this constituency that causes elected officials to go
forward with the taking.” (footnote omitted)).
87 This is an illustration of Pareto efficiency. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF LAW 17–20 (8th ed. 2011) (defining Pareto-superior transactions as those in which one
person is better off and no one is worse off). The neighbors may actually end up better off
than before, depending on the terms of the exaction and each neighbor’s particular cir-
cumstances. The owner next door to the Dolans, for example, enjoys proximity to a new
bicycle path but is burdened by the greater traffic the Dolans’ larger store will attract. That
burden, though, may lead to increased traffic to the neighbor’s establishment. Whether a neigh-
bor ends up better off or simply no worse off will vary from neighbor to neighbor and may
be impossible to calculate in advance. The agency’s goal is to maximize the odds that no
neighbor ends up worse off as a result of the project.
88 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (“[T]his Court, quite
simply, has been unable to develop any ‘set formula’ for determining when [just compensation
is due] . . . .”); River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 23 F.3d 164, 165 (7th Cir. 1994)
(decrying the proliferation of federal land use cases).
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Koontz portrays government bodies as habitual wrongdoers that must be closely
monitored, lest they cross constitutional lines whenever they believe they can get
away with it.89 The Court describes the St. Johns River Water Management District
as seeking “to evade the limitations of Nollan and Dolan”90 and possibly “pressuring
someone into forfeiting a constitutional right . . . [and] coercively withholding
benefits from those who exercise them.”91 The respondent’s actions, according to the
Court, appear “[e]xtortionate” and an exercise of “coercive pressure.”92 A contrary
decision “would effectively render Nollan and Dolan a dead letter.”93
The Supreme Court of Florida comes in for similar criticism, with the Koontz
Court stating that Florida’s high court “blessed [the District’s] maneuver” and thereby
“effectively interred” Nollan and Dolan.94 The thrust of the Court’s discussion here
is that it cannot trust state government officials or, for that matter, the justices of the
state’s highest court.95 While government officials may sometimes behave improp-
erly, the Court’s analysis assumes that this is always true, despite the fact that courts
show great deference to land use officials in nearly every other context.96 The Court
plainly feared that government bodies will take the greatest possible advantage of
an applicant’s intrinsically weaker bargaining position.97
Oddly enough, the Court expresses no similar concerns about land use permit
applicants.98 It is hardly outlandish to postulate that a property owner that might
89 133 S. Ct. at 2594–95; see also Stein, Callies & Rider, supra note 43, at 300–02.
90 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2595.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 2596.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 2591. The United States Supreme Court’s lack of deference to the Florida Su-
preme Court is nothing new. See, e.g., Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of
Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 714 (2010) (4–4 decision) (“It would be absurd to allow a State
to do by judicial decree what the Takings Clause forbids it to do by legislative fiat.”); Bush
v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) (“The contest provision, as it was mandated by the State
Supreme Court, is not well calculated to sustain the confidence that all citizens must have
in the outcome of elections.”); see also Timothy M. Mulvaney, The New Judicial Takings
Construct, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 247, 266 (2011) (“Justice Scalia’s opinion for the [Stop
the Beach Renourishment] plurality exudes distrust for state court judgments on questions
of state property law . . . .”).
95 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. 2586.
96 See infra Section II.D.
97 See Daniel P. Selmi, Takings and Extortion, 68 FLA. L. REV. 323, 354 (2016) (“The
extortion narrative presumes that local officials have considerable power and will unfairly
use it to coerce developers.”).
98 Nor does the dissent, which appears to have considerably greater faith in actors on both
sides of this question. See, e.g., Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2608 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“No one
has presented evidence that in the many States declining to apply heightened scrutiny to
permitting fees, local officials routinely short-circuit Nollan and Dolan to extort the sur-
render of real property interests having no relation to a development’s costs.”).
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profit greatly by receiving a discretionary permit could overreach in much the way
the Court sees the government as having done in Koontz.99 And unlike the typical
government official that denies a permit request, an applicant that receives a permit
enjoys direct financial benefits.100 That is why owners apply. The Court worries that
a public entity charged with protecting the community and mediating among con-
flicting land uses might bully permit applicants but seems unconcerned that a developer
seeking to maximize its profit might harm its neighbors.101
Institutional safeguards serve as a related check on government excesses.102 Real
estate development entities are concerned about the interests of only a small number
of like-minded equity holders and are legally obligated to act for the benefit of their
shareholders or partners.103 They thus face consistent, undeviating incentives to
maximize the value of their real estate, even if that means externalizing some devel-
opment costs.104 By contrast, land use decisionmakers are either elected officials,
their political appointees, or the career civil servants who report to these two groups.
The chair of a board of zoning adjustment typically serves at the whim of a mayor
who must answer to voters at regular intervals and may be pondering her chances
for higher office.105 Rather than focusing only on enriching a small number of equity
holders, that chair may idealistically strive to serve the general public or may more
cynically do whatever it takes to hang onto his job.106 Voters are likely to have a
broad range of views as to how restrictive permitting officials should be, and con-
sistent overreaching in any direction will likely be contested.107
99 Id. at 2586 (majority opinion).
100 See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 379 (1994) (applicant sought building
permit to double the size of her store and to provide space for complementary businesses).
101 See Been, supra note 17, at 487 (noting that the nexus test “ignores the role that
exactions play as ‘damages’ for the injuries that developments cause to the public”).
102 Id. at 505 n.150 (describing the public’s ability to pressure elected officials directly or
indirectly).
103 Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of
Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 354–55 (2000).
104 See Fenster, supra note 17, at 648–52.
105 Cf. Jerry L. Anderson, Aaron E. Brees & Emily C. Reninger, A Study of American
Zoning Board Composition and Public Attitudes Toward Zoning Issues, 40 URB. LAW. 689,
689–90 (2008) (noting that land use decisions are made by local administrative bodies ap-
pointed by elected officials).
106 See Michael B. Kent, Jr., Viewing the Supreme Court’s Exactions Cases Through the
Prism of Anti-Evasion, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 827, 870–71 (2016) (contrasting the majority
and dissenting opinions in Koontz and their differing views as to how well the political
process protects applicants).
107 See Been, supra note 17, at 505 & nn.150–51 (discussing options available to unhappy
citizens, including initiatives, pressure on elected representatives, lobbying against specific
applications, and litigation); Sean F. Nolon, Bargaining for Development Post-Koontz: How
the Supreme Court Invaded Local Government, 67 FLA. L. REV. 171, 192–93 (2015) (empha-
sizing the high degree of citizen involvement in the process of land use control).
2017] REVERSE EXACTIONS 17
These institutional safeguards serve as a reminder that bodies that propose
exactions are acting in a representative capacity and not in an entrepreneurial capac-
ity.108 If the public body were attempting to condemn the applicant’s land to expand
city hall, the government would be acting like any entrepreneur in need of real
estate, albeit one with less of a profit-making motive than private actors.109 But an
exaction disagreement is not a dispute between two business entities competing for
a limited resource each needs. Rather, the government body is acting as a referee,
using its land use powers prospectively to address potential incompatibilities that
previously could be addressed only post hoc, under nuisance law.110 Before land use
regulations were common, a neighbor would have to wait for a first mover to build
something intrusive and then bring a tort claim that might lead to substantial
damages, a costly injunction, and an overall waste of resources.111 Today, the gov-
ernment that proposes an exaction can evaluate in advance whether a project should
proceed and can green-light only those that do not unreasonably harm the interests
of neighbors.112
This is not to suggest that landowners with development plans can rest easy
knowing that the voters will keep every anti-development mayor in check. Voter
majorities and local views on the real estate industry range from strongly pro- to
strongly anti-development in different locales. Moreover, the Takings Clause exists
to protect property owners against majoritarian excesses.113 But in at least some
jurisdictions, property owners know that a pro-development voting majority will
likely temper whatever anti-development sentiments the planning commission’s
staff may harbor.
108 See Krier & Sterk, supra note 73, at 70–71 (observing that “courts treat government-as-
enterpriser cases quite differently from government-as-mediator cases” and that “courts
apparently consider the political process an adequate check on the behavior of regulators”).
109 See id. at 69–70.
110 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387–88 (1926) (drawing on the
common law of nuisance to justify upholding a city’s zoning ordinance).
111 Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 872 (N.Y. 1970) (awarding damages in
a nuisance case but denying an injunction because of the devastating economic consequences
the offender would suffer).
112 See Been, supra note 17, at 487 (“[T]he major flaw of the nexus test . . . is that it
ignores the role that exactions play as ‘damages’ for the injuries that developments cause to
the public.” (footnote omitted)).
113 See, e.g., William A. Fischel, Introduction: Utilitarian Balancing and Formalism in
Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1581, 1582 (1988) (“The real regulation problem is one of po-
litical success, that is, of political majorities ganging up on effete minorities.”); Saul Levmore,
Just Compensation and Just Politics, 22 CONN. L. REV. 285, 309 (1990) (noting “[a] central
theme of takings law is that protection is offered against the possibility that majorities may
mistreat minorities,” and expressing concern about “the realistic fear that the ganging up will
too often be at the expense of the neighbor who is most different or most nonconforming”).
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D. The Court Has Shown Little of its Traditional Deference to Governments
that Exact
The Court’s exaction jurisprudence also shows none of the deference to govern-
ment actors that its opinions customarily show in other land use cases.114 In most
land use settings, government actions are presumed to be constitutional.115 While the
dissent calls Koontz “a run-of-the-mill denial of a land-use permit,”116 the majority
quite obviously disagrees.117 This reduced deference applies to both the substantive
legal standard government defendants now have to meet and to the procedural ques-
tion of which party bears the burden of meeting that standard.118 After Koontz, the
state must meet the Court’s exaction standards in a broader range of cases and also
must produce evidence and persuade the finder of fact.119
114 See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2607 (Kagan, J., dis-
senting) (discussing the “significant practical harm” flowing from the Court’s decision). See
generally Fennell & Peñalver, supra note 74, at 357 (“In Nollan and Dolan, the Court started
down a path that, if followed beyond a certain point, cannot be reconciled with broad judicial
deference to garden-variety land use controls.”); Fenster, supra note 17, at 652–67 (criticizing
the Court for scrutinizing exactions far more closely than other types of alleged takings).
115 A sharply divided Court allowed government bodies tremendous leeway in interpreting
the Fifth Amendment’s Public Use Clause in Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
The facts of that case surely provide landowners with more to fear than the facts of Koontz. And
in many unremarkable land use cases outside of the exaction context, the Court has been willing
to presume that government actions are constitutional, most notably in Penn Central Trans-
portation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (upholding a city’s landmark preservation
law), a case Justice O’Connor later called the Court’s “polestar.” Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533
U.S. 606, 633 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544
U.S. 528, 539–40 (2005) (unanimous opinion) (reaffirming the centrality of Penn Central).
116 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2611 (Kagan, J., dissenting). The dissent also notes that “[t]he
majority turns a broad array of local land-use regulations into federal constitutional
questions. . . . It places courts smack in the middle of the most everyday local government
activity.” Id. at 2612.
117 Id. at 2603 (majority opinion); see also Selmi, supra note 97, at 325 (“[The extortion]
narrative sees local governments not as acting in good faith in the public interest, but as fixed
on extorting concessions out of developers. It is a narrative of unbridled governmental
coercion and, consequently, of extreme judicial distrust of local governments.”).
118 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 n.8 (1994) (imposing this burden on the
city); John D. Echeverria, A Legal Blow to Sustainable Development, N.Y. TIMES (June 26,
2013), https://nyti.ms/139bHti (“After Koontz, developers have a potent new legal tool to
challenge such charges because now the legal burden of demonstrating their validity is on
the communities themselves.”).
119 See Echeverria, supra note 118 (“[T]he revolutionary and destructive step taken by the
court in Koontz is to cast the burden on the government to justify the mandates . . . . This is
contrary to the traditional court approach of according deference to elected officials and
technical experts on issues of regulatory policy.”); Marshall S. Sprung, Note, Taking Sides:
The Burden of Proof Switch in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1301, 1304–06
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Worse still for government defendants, the Court held in 1987 that a property
owner that prevails on a regulatory takings claim is entitled to compensation dating
back to the time at which the taking commenced.120 After Koontz, compensation may
run from as early as the date on which the government proposed the exaction.121 In
short, governments defending against exaction claims have both a tough burden to
carry and much to lose if they cannot carry it.
The Koontz Court is highly skeptical that proper land use planning efforts serve
the public welfare.122 The Court does begin by noting the public purposes set forth
in the Florida law that authorizes the respondent to manage the state’s wetlands.123
The Court also recognizes, as noted above, that private property rights must be
balanced against the public good and that landowners sometimes must internalize
the external costs their use of property imposes on their neighbors.124 But rather than
assuming that land use officials are fair-minded public servants who sometimes err,
the Court is plainly concerned that these government actors must be vigilantly
watched to prevent or deter frequent deliberate wrongdoing.125 The general tenor of
the Koontz opinion is to protect the constitutional rights of private actors that have
a distinct incentive to overreach and to express strong concerns about the hidden
motives of bodies that have long been presumed to be serving the public good.126
(1996) (describing how Dolan shifted the burden of proof from the property owner to the
government).
120 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304, 322 (1987) (holding “that invalidation of the ordinance without payment of fair
value for the use of the property during this period of time would be a constitutionally
insufficient remedy”); Timothy M. Mulvaney, On Bargaining for Development, 67 FLA. L.
REV. F. 66, 67–71 (2015) (tracing the chilling effect of Koontz to First English).
121 Note, however, that normal permitting delays are not compensable. See First English,
482 U.S. at 321 (limiting the “holding to the facts presented, and . . . not deal[ing] with the
quite different questions that would arise in the case of normal delays”).
122 See, for example, the Florida Water Resources Act, FLA. STAT. § 373.016(1)–(2)
(2016), the statute at issue in Koontz, which declares its policy as follows:
The waters in the state are among its basic resources. Such waters have
not heretofore been conserved or fully controlled so as to realize their
full beneficial use. The department and the governing board shall take
into account cumulative impacts on water resources and manage those
resources in a manner to ensure their sustainability.
123 Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2592 (2013).
124 Id. at 2595.
125 Id. (“[W]e have recognized that regardless of whether the government ultimately
succeeds in pressuring someone into forfeiting a constitutional right, the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine forbids burdening the Constitution’s enumerated rights by coercively
withholding benefits from those who exercise them.”).
126 Id. at 2594 (noting that “land-use permit applicants are especially vulnerable to the
type of coercion that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine prohibits because the govern-
ment often has broad discretion to deny a permit that is worth far more than property it would
like to take”).
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Thus, applicants merely must “bear the full costs of their proposals,” while governments
have to be scrutinized carefully lest they engage in “out-and-out . . . extortion.”127
E. The Point of Most Exactions Is to Internalize the Applicant’s Costs
An exaction forces a permit applicant to devote part of its profit to compensating
its neighbors for the external costs they otherwise would bear. If the applicant will be
$1,000,000 better off but the neighbors will suffer external costs of $100,000, then
any exaction that transfers an amount of at least $100,000 and less than $1,000,000
from the applicant to the neighbors guarantees that the applicant still receives a net
benefit while the neighbors suffer no loss, and perhaps even benefit themselves. The
community as a whole is better off and enjoys the project’s $900,000 net benefit, no
party is worse off after the exaction and some or all of them are better off, and a
development that enriches the community overall can proceed.128 The only question
is how that net gain of $900,000 is shared.
Most importantly, the developer does not profit personally by forcing others to
suffer losses, which means that the government is performing an essential role exactly
as it should, a point even the Koontz majority acknowledges.129 Making exactions un-
acceptably costly or risky for government agencies will force those agencies either to
grant permits unconditionally or to deny them outright in settings in which an exaction
might be desirable and equitable.130 When this happens, applicants, their neighbors, or
both may end up worse off than before.131 To the extent the Koontz majority fears
government action that harms neighboring landowners, it might even embrace this
Article’s proposals, which are designed to prevent government action from harming
someone’s property rights.132 These proposals preserve the viability of exactions
while ensuring that they harm neither an applicant nor other property owners nearby.133
127 Id. at 2595 (citing Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987)); cf. Selmi,
supra note 97, at 376 (concluding that judicial adoption of an extortion narrative is misplaced).
128 See POSNER, supra note 87, at 17–20.
129 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2595 (“A second reality of the permitting process is that many pro-
posed land uses threaten to impose costs on the public that dedications of property can offset.”).
130 Id. at 2610 (Kagan, J., dissenting):
If a local government risked a lawsuit every time it made a suggestion to
an applicant about how to meet permitting criteria, it would cease to do
so; indeed, the government might desist altogether from communicating
with applicants. That hazard is to some extent baked into Nollan and
Dolan; observers have wondered whether those decisions have inclined
some local governments to deny permit applications outright, rather than
negotiate agreements that could work to both sides’ advantage.
131 See Fenster, supra note 17, at 665 (explaining that rejecting applications may make the
property owner “significantly worse off than if she could bargain freely with the local gov-
ernment over conditions that might win an approval”).
132 See infra Part III.
133 See infra Part III.
2017] REVERSE EXACTIONS 21
F. Summary of the Court’s Central Fallacy
Exaction law today presupposes that government bodies are acting like private
developers and maximizing their own financial well-being at the expense of permit
applicants.134 While this may be true in some cases, a court should not assume this
type of self-interested behavior as a starting point. Government bodies charged with
acting in the public interest as referees rather than as entrepreneurs often have little
to gain by using the exaction power too aggressively, a point Professor Joseph Sax
recognized more than a half-century ago.135 Moreover, they may have much to lose
if they do so, including increasing their recurring expenses, generating political
backlash, and defending inverse condemnation claims. Institutional checks already
minimize the risk of government wrongdoing.136 Voters will not necessarily oppose
a given project, while permit applicants frequently are repeat players with sharply
focused interests and the benefit of superior legal representation.137 There is no
reason to weaken further the separation of powers doctrine and long-standing
judicial deference to government bodies, and certainly no reason to do so in a setting
in which misbehavior is relatively unlikely.
If the government is acting as a referee rather than as a developer, courts should
safeguard its ability to act as a fair arbiter. Current exaction law, however, does just
the opposite, by tipping the scales heavily in favor of one of the contestants.138
Applicants control both the content and the timing of every proposal, while adminis-
trative bodies merely respond to applications as they arrive. Neighbors—the truly
interested counterparties who ultimately have the most to lose—may not learn about
applications until they have progressed considerably and gained momentum. These
neighbors are playing defense throughout, and the best outcome they can typically
hope for is maintenance of the status quo. They must organize, retain counsel, and
spend their own money and time—assuming that they possess these two important
resources—with the sole goal of making sure that nothing changes for the worse.
The burden of proof in an exaction claim is on the government.139 And governments
134 See Selmi, supra note 97, at 338–39 (arguing that elected officials will seek to extract
benefits from developers for voters).
135 See Sax, supra note 14, at 63:
[W]hen economic loss is incurred as a result of government enhance-
ment of its resource position in its enterprise capacity, then compensation
is constitutionally required; it is that result which is to be characterized
as a taking. But losses, however severe, incurred as a consequence of
government acting merely in its arbitral capacity are to be viewed as a
non-compensable exercise of the police power.
136 See Krier & Sterk, supra note 73, at 71.
137 See Fennell & Peñalver, supra note 74, at 316–17.
138 See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2607–09 (2013)
(Kagan, J., dissenting).
139 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 395 (1994).
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that lose exaction claims face potentially budget-busting liability under First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles.140 These factors
constrain public input and intimidate government bodies whose members already
must answer to elected officials and the people who elected them.141 It is hardly
surprising if some government bodies grant their consent unconditionally or with
conditions that are too weak, given the risks they face for even suggesting condi-
tions that are more balanced. By assuming the worst of government officials, current
doctrine increases the likelihood that they will serve as one-sided decisionmakers
rather than truly fair mediators.
III. TWO POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
Nollan142 and Dolan143 look only at the losses applicants may suffer if exactions
are too muscular and completely disregard the losses neighbors may suffer if exactions
are not muscular enough. It is not surprising that the case law has developed in this
imbalanced way and that neighbors have fared so poorly under it, given that applicants
are the parties that initiate and pursue exaction claims against government bodies.
Courts, particularly the Supreme Court, could address this imbalance in two ways.
A. Re-Examine the Court’s Exaction Case Law
The Court might decide that it needs to re-examine Nollan,144 Dolan,145 and
Koontz.146 By so doing, the Court would recognize that it has shown too little defer-
ence to government agencies and has established a standard that is too difficult for
them to meet. The Court might acknowledge that it provides government bodies
more leeway in other areas of takings law and decide to offer greater flexibility here
by pulling back from its existing stringent exactions tests.147
This approach would be fairly simple to implement, but it seems unlikely that
the Court will revisit this body of doctrine. To begin with, the Court has developed
this case law incrementally over a period of three decades.148 This is not a single
140 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
141 See Fenster, supra note 17, at 654 (noting that local governments may fail to impose
exactions due to concerns about high legal costs).
142 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
143 Dolan, 512 U.S. 374.
144 Nollan, 483 U.S. 825.
145 Dolan, 512 U.S. 374.
146 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013).
147 See John D. Echeverria, Koontz: The Very Worst Takings Decision Ever?, 22 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 1, 49 (2014) (“It is not beyond the realm of possibility that one or more justices
in the majority will have second thoughts about the opinion and seek in the future to limit or
possibly jettison one or both rulings.”).
148 See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. 2586; Dolan, 512 U.S. 374; Nollan, 483 U.S. 825.
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uncharacteristic opinion, but rather three cases from 1987,149 1994,150 and 2013151
that build on each other. The Koontz Court had the opportunity to reconsider its
earlier cases not long ago and opted to ratify the two prior precedential cases.152
Given that all of these cases were decided by 5–4 margins, it is always possible
that the Court—with only one change in personnel since Koontz was decided—
might reconsider its three earlier cases.153 But while the Court is free to rethink case
law it views as ill-considered, this Article will not argue that the Court should
overrule its precedent.154 Three overlapping groups of dissenters have already done
a fine job of making the arguments against current exaction doctrine, but at the end
of the day, they were penning dissents and not opinions of the Court.155
While it is not particularly fruitful for a legal scholar to argue that the Court “got
it wrong” in three cases and should overrule them,156 I do note here that it is entirely
possible that the Court might limit those three cases considerably without disturbing
them.157 This approach would reaffirm that the existing cases may be an appropriate
mechanism for curbing the most flagrant government abuses but that they need to
149 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 (holding that an essential nexus must exist between the gov-
ernment interest and the condition placed on the applicant).
150 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 (developing the rough proportionality test). 
151 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2603 (holding that “government’s demand for property from a
land-use permit applicant must satisfy the requirements of Nollan and Dolan even when the
government denies the permit and even when its demand is for money”).
152 Id.
153 The Court unanimously reaffirmed Nollan and Dolan in 2005, in Lingle v. Chevron
U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 545–48 (2005).
154 Cf. Mulvaney, supra note 120, at 75–76 (recognizing this option without advocating
for it).
155 Justice Brennan’s dissent in Nollan argues that the Court has “given appellants a wind-
fall at the expense of the public.” 483 U.S. 825, 842 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice
Stevens’s dissent in Dolan suggests the burden on city governments is unjustified. 512 U.S.
at 403 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Kagan’s dissent in Koontz argues that the Takings
Clause does not apply because Koontz did not surrender any identifiable property. 133 S. Ct.
at 2605 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
156 Cf. Ilya Somin, Putting Kelo in Perspective, 48 CONN. L. REV. 1551, 1554 (2016)
(“‘[R]easonable and long-accepted’ and ‘part of the legal mainstream’ is not the equivalent
of correct or logically sound reasoning.” (quoting Wesley W. Horton & Brendon P. Levesque,
Kelo Is Not Dred Scott, 48 CONN. L. REV. 1405, 1408 (2016))); id. at 1560–61 (“Kelo is
indeed not as bad as Dred Scott, certainly not in every way. But it is bad enough to deserve
severe criticism, and bad enough that the Supreme Court should overrule it as soon as pos-
sible.”). Kelo, like Koontz, is the third in a decades-long series of cases the Court has decided
in a consistent fashion and, as Professor Somin concedes, Kelo was entirely justifiable under
existing doctrine. Id. at 1554. Moreover, the three cases addressing public use were spread
out over an even longer period than Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz, giving a larger number of
Justices the opportunity to reconsider the Court’s doctrine, an invitation the Court declined.
157 See Carlos A. Ball & Laurie Reynolds, Exactions and Burden Distribution in Takings
Law, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1513, 1518 (2006) (“[W]e explore in this Article how the
Nollan-Dolan test can be reformed, rather than argue that it should be overruled.”).
24 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 26:1
be circumscribed to avoid discouraging much legitimate and appropriate govern-
ment behavior. The Court, in short, could treat the case law as binding but perhaps
too broad—a core of precedent encircled by a penumbra of dicta. When suitable
facts arise, the Court could explain that the existing case law provides more balance
than some observers currently read into it. For example, the Court might clarify that
existing exaction doctrine applies to cases in which overzealous administrative of-
ficials exact too much in particular cases without bringing into question the validity
of land use restrictions authorized by more broadly applicable legislation.158
B. Recognize Reverse Exaction Claims
Rather than arguing that the Court should overrule three established cases, this
Part instead would right the imbalance in current doctrine by recognizing a “reverse
exaction” claim that neighbors can bring against government officials. In a reverse
exaction claim, an applicant’s neighbors would argue that government officials have
imposed conditions on the applicant’s development that insufficiently internalize the
externalities that the applicant’s project would impose on those neighbors. By under-
exacting land use applicants, the government forces the applicants’ neighbors to bear
the remaining costs attributable to the project, thereby impairing the neighbors’
property rights unconstitutionally. Under this second and more measured option, the
Court would endorse the validity of Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz—perhaps limited as
just noted159—but recognize reciprocal rights in neighbors affected negatively by an
exaction that inadequately internalizes a project’s costs.160
To the greatest extent possible, reverse exaction claims would mirror traditional
exaction claims, much as inverse condemnation suits reflect direct takings.161 In a
reverse exaction claim, one or more disappointed neighbors would be the plaintiffs,
bringing an action against the government. Like permit applicants, neighbors would
challenge exactions based on their specific content, with the obvious difference that
they would argue that rather than going too far, the proposed exactions do not go far
enough.162 Just as permit applicants that bring direct exaction claims are concerned
with impositions that overly safeguard the neighbors’ rights while impairing those
158 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
159 See supra Section III.A.
160 A reverse exaction would exhibit some, but not all, of the attributes of a “passive
taking.” See Christopher Serkin, Passive Takings: The State’s Affirmative Duty to Protect
Property, 113 MICH. L. REV. 345, 346 (2014). The government will have taken by insuffi-
cient action rather than by no action at all. See id. at 372–77 (discussing the distinction between
acts and omissions).
161 Complete mirroring is not possible, as discussed below. See infra Section III.B.5.
162 Reverse takings claims can arise in other contexts as well. See, e.g., Michael Pappas,
A Right to be Regulated?, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 99, 105 (2016) (“The key question for this
Article is whether the absence, curtailment, or reduction of regulation can interfere with a
protected property interest such that it triggers legal protection. When, as a matter of property
rights, can we say that government regulation has not gone far enough?”).
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of the applicant, the concern of neighbors bringing a reverse exaction claim would
be that the exaction overly protects the applicant to the neighbors’ detriment.163
The first prong of a reverse exaction claim would parallel the “essential nexus”
requirement set forth in Nollan,164 while the second prong would reflect Dolan’s
“rough proportionality” mandate,165 and a neighbor who can make either of these
showings would prevail. Any compensation that the government is required to pay
to the prevailing neighbors would be charged back to the applicant that effectively
took private property by not adequately offsetting the negative effects of its project.166
This source of funding parallels awards for traditional exaction claims, which are
ultimately paid by the taxpayers who benefited collectively from the unconstitu-
tional exaction that took the applicant’s property.167 The remainder of this Part will
elaborate on these points and provide illustrations, will note some concerns this
approach might raise, and will address those concerns.
If the exaction test is a balancing test that seeks to determine whether an admin-
istrative agency has imposed appropriate conditions, then it is unfair to allow only
one of the parties whose interests are being balanced to challenge the government’s
activities. Such an approach protects only the rights of permit applicants. And if the
government faces potential liability in only one direction, it inevitably will favor that
party’s rights, since it can avoid litigation losses in that manner and only in that man-
ner. To ensure a fair balance and to protect the rights of other interested property
owners, the ability to challenge exactions must be reciprocal.168 And since the other
163 Cf. C.I.V.I.C. Grp. v. City of Warren, 723 N.E.2d 106, 110–11 (Ohio 2000) (holding,
in a suit by a private civic association, that the Ohio Constitution prohibits a city from raising
money for or loaning its credit to a private corporation).
164 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (holding that an essential nexus must exist between the
government’s interest and the condition placed on the applicant).
165 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).
166 Cf. Lee Anne Fennell, Picturing Takings, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 57, 103–04 (2012)
(suggesting, in the judicial takings context, that “[an] owner could unilaterally get the govern-
ment not to appropriate the property by making a specified payment” (footnote omitted)).
167 See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 86, at 401 (“Government does not . . . internalize the
costs of compensation payments: Taxpaying citizens do. Nor does government benefit from
takings: Some constituency of citizens does. . . . Just compensation . . . is effectively a
collective sanction imposed on the members of this political community.”); Levinson, supra
note 103, at 347 (“[T]here is every reason to expect government to behave quite differently
from private firms. Because government actors respond to political, not market, incentives,
we should not assume that government will internalize social costs just because it is forced to
make a budgetary outlay.”). Note as well that Koontz recognizes the possibility that an applicant
might prevail and receive an award even though the government has not actually taken its
property. 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2597 (2013) (“In cases where there is an excessive demand but
no taking, whether money damages are available is not a question of federal constitutional
law but of the cause of action—whether state or federal—on which the landowner relies.”).
168 Echeverria, supra note 17, at 604 (“There is no a priori reason to favor property owners
whose interests are served by developing property over property owners whose interests are
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interested parties here are the neighbors—with the government body serving merely
as intermediary—those neighbors must enjoy the right to challenge exactions they
believe tilt too far in favor of applicants.169
1. The Nollan Prong of a Reverse Exaction Claim
The first half of the traditional exaction test asks whether there is an essential
nexus between a public problem the applicant’s project will create and the condition
the government agency places on its permit approval to mitigate that problem.170
When a landowner brings an exaction claim, the government body is put to the dual
tasks of enumerating its legitimate state interests and demonstrating how the im-
posed conditions substantially advances those interests.171 The California Coastal
Commission identified three state interests that the Court was willing to regard as
legitimate,172 but the conditions the Commission imposed on the Nollans did not
substantially advance those interests—in the Court’s view, they did not even come
close.173 Thus, the exaction lacked the requisite “essential nexus.”174
The first part of a reverse exaction claim would argue that the government’s con-
dition does not adequately mitigate a problem that the applicant’s project would
create or exacerbate. Just as the Nollan Court held that a permit applicant may recover
if the exaction does not substantially advance the legitimate state interests the govern-
ment asserts, a court evaluating a reverse exaction claim would ask whether the exac-
tion substantially advances the legitimate state interest of internalizing the off-premises
effects the proposal will generate or worsen. A court will likely find that forcing an
applicant to avoid harming its neighbors is a legitimate agency goal,175 which means
that the sole question of law ordinarily will be whether the permit condition is crafted
served by community protection. The Constitution protects the interests of property owners
but it also protects the interests of citizens in the benefits of representative government.”).
169 Cf. Joseph Belza, Note, Inverse Condemnation and Fracking Disasters: Government
Liability for the Environmental Consequences of Hydraulic Fracturing Under a Constitu-
tional Takings Theory, 44 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 55 (2017) (arguing that those harmed
by fracking should be allowed to bring an inverse condemnation claim against the government
actor that permitted the fracking, not just a private law claim against the entity that caused
the harm).
170 See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
171 Id. at 834.
172 Id. at 834–35.
173 Id. at 838–39.
174 Id. at 837 (adopting and describing the “essential nexus” test to be used in exaction
cases). Although the Nollan Court implemented this standard, it did not define that term. The
opinion uses the word “nexus” only twice—with an additional reference in Justice Blackmun’s
dissent—and modifies “nexus” with the adjective “essential” only once. Id.; id. at 865
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
175 See id. at 834–35 (majority opinion) (noting that a broad range of government interests
would satisfy the exaction requirements).
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in a manner that substantially advances that aim. The intended beneficiary of the gov-
ernment’s exaction is arguing that the government, in its capacity as arbiter between
incompatible adjacent uses, did not go far enough in protecting its property rights.
If a condition “utterly fails to further the end advanced as the justification for
the prohibition,”176 then it flunks Nollan’s direct exaction test.177 In fact, a condition
can do a better job than that and still fail under Nollan.178 But land use agencies have
learned since Nollan and Dolan exactly what types of responses are acceptable and,
however much they might be inclined to over-exact, potential liability serves as a
powerful brake.179 If anything, as Professors Carlson and Pollak observed several
years after Dolan, “The decisions seem to have nudged many localities into more
systematic, comprehensive planning through the preparation of reports and studies
justifying and documenting the rationale for exacting money or land from develop-
ers.”180 In other words, the two cases have done exactly what they were supposed to
do.181 Similarly, a condition that “utterly fail[ed]” to internalize an externality—or
even one that failed in substantially advancing this goal—would lead to government
liability for a reverse exaction.182 The same planners who quickly learned how to
avoid exacting too much presumably will learn how to avoid exacting too little.
Once reverse exactions are firmly established, successful reverse claims are likely
to be as rare as successful claims of direct exactions. The main value of the twin
doctrines will be the ways in which they prospectively shape agency practice.
Cases at either extreme might lead to liability, but those extreme cases will arise
infrequently and will become even less common as planners learn the new rules.
Most conditions that government agents impose will mitigate a negative effect to
some degree,183 falling at neither of these compensable limits. Permit conditions
aimed at making applicants pay for the problems they cause will rarely be total fail-
ures or total successes. As a result, government entities usually will not face liabil-
ity, since neither an applicant nor a disgruntled neighbor will be able to meet the
difficult thresholds these dual tests demand. Human actors responding to particular-
ized problems will devise one or more responses out of a wide range of possibilities.
176 Id. at 837.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 For a discussion of five reasons government bodies may over-exact, see Been, supra
note 17, at 483–506. See also Fenster, supra note 48, at 738–40 (highlighting problems
exactions can create).
180 Ann E. Carlson & Daniel Pollak, Takings on the Ground: How the Supreme Court’s Tak-
ings Jurisprudence Affects Local Land Use Decisions, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 103, 105 (2001).
181 “Contrary to initially negative reactions to the Court decisions, we found that an
overwhelming percentage of California planners now view the Nollan and Dolan cases not
as an encroachment upon their planning discretion but instead as establishing ‘good planning
practices.’” Id.
182 Cf. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
183 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 387–88 (1994) (finding an essential nexus for
two distinct exactions).
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The conditions they ask an applicant to accept are likely to address a problem
imperfectly, neither completely solving it nor wholly failing to address it. Such an
exaction is a reasonable attempt: it does not take the applicant’s property, it does not
take the property of the applicant’s neighbors, and a government defendant will pre-
vail in either type of claim. Most likely, no such claim will ever be brought and, if
it is, it will last only until one party’s motion for summary judgment. In short,
government bodies will enjoy a considerable margin of error.
Moreover, externalities and exactions both come in many flavors: an applicant’s
project can cause all different sorts of direct and indirect off-premises effects,184 and
governments can respond to this wide range of negative results in a multitude of
different ways.185 These are the types of localized, site-specific negotiations that ex-
actions are designed to foster and that exaction law ought to encourage.186 A devel-
oper makes a proposal that will enrich itself and harm its neighbors. That developer
is naturally more concerned with maximizing its own profits than with spending
money that it may not need to spend in order to assuage the concerns of owners
nearby. A government actor charged with balancing the developer’s desires against
the public interest formulates a response that imperfectly mitigates the proposal’s
negative effects. The actor charged with replying to the request draws on her
education and experience, also taking into account past dealings with this particular
applicant, while being distracted by whatever other applications are on her plate.
From the range of possible responses, the land use official selects the one she deter-
mines to be most appropriate. The developer counteroffers in a way that will cost
less than the government’s proposal, and the government decides that it can live
with some but not all of this recrafted bid.187 The parties behave predictably and
bumble through a run-of-the-mill negotiation, most often reaching a compromise
that the applicant can live with—or at least will not sue over188—and that causes
neighbors to grumble but not to initiate litigation.
Through this very common back-and-forth, parties with conflicting interests
often are able to achieve imperfect solutions to the problems the developer’s project
will cause.189 The externality is partially internalized, the applicant is able to obtain
184 See Amnon Lehavi, Zoning and Market Externalities, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 361,
382–84 (2017).
185 See generally id. (distinguishing among different types of externalities and discussing
the propriety of local government zoning responses to each type).
186 See Fenster, supra note 17, at 615 (“Local governments developed exactions as a po-
litical and administrative means to resolve highly charged, individualized, and localized disputes
fraught with legal, financial, scientific, emotional, and ultimately political controversy.”).
187 See, e.g., Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172,
176–82 (1985) (describing a typically complex multi-year negotiation between a developer
and a county planning commission in a non-exaction context).
188 See Krier & Sterk, supra note 73, at 68–69 (finding that exactions are less likely to lead
to subsequent litigation than are other types of regulations and surmising that landowners
who receive a permit are willing to live with these exactions rather than litigating).
189 See, e.g., id.
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its permit while minimizing as much as possible the costs of the exaction that it must
bear, and the neighbors’ interests are guarded somewhat, if not entirely. The project
proceeds, no one is completely happy, and the bargaining works about as well as
anyone can expect. The parties reach a satisfactory outcome, and “[a] good compro-
mise leaves everybody mad.”190
Under both the existing Nollan exaction test and the reverse exaction analysis
proposed here, unhappy applicants or neighbors should know they are likely to lose
these run-of-the-mill claims and likely will not waste their time and energy bother-
ing to bring one.191 Such an exaction will have no constitutional implications; in-
deed, developers and government agencies reach these types of compromises every
day. The reverse exaction proposal protects neighbors against the most egregious
under-exactions, thereby dramatically reducing the likelihood that this behavior will
occur and providing a remedy on those infrequent occasions when it does.192 The
primary effect of judicial recognition of reverse exaction claims should be the
recentering of permit negotiations in a way that does not unfairly favor applicants
in the way that current doctrine does. In other words, a reverse exaction claim does
for neighbors precisely what Nollan does for permit applicants.
2. The Dolan Prong of a Reverse Exaction Claim
An exaction may possess the required essential nexus but still fail the second
part of the exaction test. The Dolan prong of a traditional exaction claim asks
“whether the degree of the exactions demanded by the city’s permit conditions bears
the required relationship to the projected impact of petitioner’s proposed develop-
ment.”193 This second prong focuses on the magnitude of the condition, asking
whether the exaction is “roughly proportional[ ]” to the externality it is supposed to
internalize or whether the government is asking too much, as the Court found—
twice—in Dolan.194 A reverse exaction claim would ask whether the condition
proposed by the government under-corrects the problem that the applicant will cause
and thereby imposes costs on those neighbors for which they must be compensated.
As with traditional claims raised by permit applicants, “[n]o precise mathematical
calculation” would be required, but the public body “must make some effort to
quantify its findings [that the exaction will be adequate to offset the negative effects
190 Bill Watterson, Calvin and Hobbes: A Good Compromise Leaves Everybody Mad,
http://thecuriousbrain.com/?p=26200 [https://perma.cc/C8AQ-BJYF]; see also Billions: Indian
Four (Showtime television broadcast Mar. 26, 2017) (“Nobody leaves a negotiation happy.”).
191 Cf. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 834–36 (1987) (observing that an
imposition upon property does not automatically violate the Takings Clause).
192 Cf. id. at 837 (discussing how a landowner is protected against over-exactions in the
traditional exaction context).
193 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 388 (1994).
194 Id. at 391.
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of the proposed development] beyond the conclusory statement that it could offset
some of the [negative effects].”195
Once again, the Dolan test is designed to address only the most egregious exac-
tions, cases in which there is not even a rough proportionality between the problem the
applicant will cause and the magnitude of the condition the government proposes in
response.196 The second prong of the reverse exaction test aims to accomplish this same
goal.197 In a reverse exaction claim, the government would not have to demonstrate
scrupulously that it has exacted precisely the right amount. Rather, it must undertake
an “individualized determination” that the exaction it proposes is “related . . . in . . .
extent to the impact of the proposed development.”198 If the exaction bears some
proportionality to the problem it seeks to address, as it probably will in the typical
case, then neighbors will be unable to carry the burden of meeting this second
exaction prong and their claim will fail.199
The Dolan test penalizes only those governments that miss the mark by a wide
margin, and the second prong of the reverse exaction standard would aim to accom-
plish this same goal at the opposite extreme. Just as with the Nollan prong, the
Dolan half of the reverse exaction standard would leave most government actions
unaffected. This expansive middle ground would once again allow for wide-ranging
negotiations between applicants and government bodies. The standard proposed
here, echoing the Court’s Dolan holding, would recognize fully that these mostly
local questions should be decided by local parties, who have far greater knowledge
of the peculiarities of the area in which the real estate is located than a state or
federal judge is likely to possess.200 Most exactions, and the negotiations leading up
to them, would easily avoid constitutional problems, and a dispute would violate
constitutional standards only rarely.
Government bodies concerned about reverse exaction claims might choose to
be more meticulous than Dolan requires, as some surely do now when contemplating
traditional claims. These bodies, advised by cautious counsel, are acknowledging
that each proposed exaction is a potential lawsuit—especially after Koontz201—and
deciding to dot every “i” and cross every “t.” They are in effect purchasing insur-
ance, opting to spend extra money on traffic studies and pollution consultants today
to avoid the small chance of a huge judgment tomorrow.202 These agencies could
195 Id. at 395–96.
196 See id. at 388–91.
197 Cf. id.
198 Id. at 391.
199 See id. at 390–91.
200 See id. at 389–91 (discussing cases in which jurisdictions made individualized de-
cisions based on the impact such changes would have in the locale).
201 See 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013).
202 See Nolon, supra note 107, at 211–19 (describing five approaches, including this one,
that land use bodies might safely pursue after Koontz); see also Mulvaney, supra note 120,
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decide to approach the second prong of a reverse exaction claim in the same way,
but nothing in Dolan would require them to act so conservatively.203 More likely,
government officials that respond to application requests will seek to establish
themselves as conscientious stewards of the public interest and will take their
responsibilities seriously, including those under Nollan and Dolan.204 That is what
they are supposed to do, and concerns about litigation from either type of plaintiff
will help focus their attention on the nature and magnitude of the property rights they
seek to exact. By behaving in this manner, these government agencies will establish
a reputation for proper behavior that might discourage some potential plaintiffs
along the way.
3. The Source of Any Compensation Award Following a Successful Reverse
Exaction Claim
The source of funds for any award resulting from a successful reverse exaction
claim similarly would reflect the payment source for traditional exaction claims. In
a traditional claim, the government is required under the Fifth Amendment to pay
just compensation to the prevailing owner.205 But “the government” is merely a pass-
through entity, raising funds from one group and transferring them to another.206 The
government ordinarily compensates the successful applicant out of general tax reve-
nues or reserve funds, which is to say money that has been paid or will be paid by
taxpayers. In the cases of local governments such as cities or counties, this typically
means revenues from taxes on income, sales, and real property, although severance
taxes, license and motor vehicle fees, insurance proceeds, user fees, and other
at 67–73 (reviewing Nolon’s article and describing five additional approaches). But see Daniel
P. Selmi, Negotiations in the Aftermath of Koontz, 75 MD. L. REV. 743, 756 (2016) (“The com-
plexity of land use factors and the variable nature of negotiations in light of municipal discretion
mean that Koontz will not play a large role in negotiations over development approvals.”).
203 See generally Dolan, 512 U.S. 374.
204 See Carlson & Pollak, supra note 180, at 116–17 (describing planners’ high level of
familiarity with the Nollan and Dolan standards).
205 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.”); Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385 (“[T]he government may not require a person
to give up a constitutional right—here the right to receive just compensation when property
is taken for a public use—in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the govern-
ment where the benefit sought has little or no relationship to the property.”).
206 Eyal Benvenisti, Sovereignty and the Politics of Property, 18 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES
L. 447, 448 (2017):
The debate whether property is a limit on or the product of sovereignty
envisages a tension between “the individual owner” and “the state.”
But “the state” is not more than the aggregate of individuals who define
theirs and others’ property rights through the political process. Stated
differently, then, the underlying tension between property and sovereignty
is a tension between the citizens.
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miscellaneous revenue sources may also be available.207 If the government body has
the money on hand, it pays compensation to the successful plaintiff, thereby reduc-
ing the funding that is available to meet other government needs.208 If it does not
have the money it needs, the government will have to raise taxes or fees, issue debt
that ultimately must be repaid, or forego future projects that it otherwise would have
undertaken.209 The taxpayers pay the compensation either from cash yesterday, cash
today, cash tomorrow, or lower quality of life if, for example, the government must
reduce spending on other government services.210
In this way, the Takings Clause ensures that the beneficiary of the taking, the
public at large, compensates the party that suffered the taking, the applicant that did
not receive a permit to which it was constitutionally entitled.211 As the Court stated
in Armstrong v. United States,212 “The Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that private
property shall not be taken for a public use without just compensation was designed
to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which,
in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”213 The govern-
ment arbiter serves merely as an intermediary: it assesses taxes and fees against
members of the general public, collects those funds, and pays just compensation out
of those revenues to the specific party from whom it has acquired property.214
The neighbors of an over-exacted permit applicant benefit because the applicant
is forced to concede more than the Constitution allows, thereby enhancing the value
of the neighbors’ property, and the neighbors must comply with the Constitution by
paying for this benefit indirectly. The people of California had to compensate the
Nollans for an easement that the public otherwise would have received at a price that
was constitutionally inadequate.215 The people of Tigard enjoyed a new bicycle path
207 Elizabeth Malm & Ellen Kant, Fiscal Fact No. 354: The Sources of State and Local
Tax Revenues, TAX FOUND. (Jan. 29, 2013), https://files.taxfoundation.org/legacy/docs/ff354
.pdf [https://perma.cc/XE4E-GBWB].
208 See Echeverria, supra note 17, at 603–04.
209 See id.
210 See id. at 603 (“A major, unexpected takings award based on regulatory activity can
throw a small, finely-tuned municipal budget into complete disarray.”).
211 See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
212 Id.
213 Id. But see Nestor M. Davidson, The Problem of Equality in Takings, 102 NW. U. L.
REV. 1, 28–31 (2008) (suggesting that courts should focus less on this question and more on
whether a government action is the functional equivalent of a physical appropriation).
214 In some cases, the payments are not made by precisely the same parties who benefit
from an exaction. Jurisdictions often raise revenue from non-residents—who do not vote in
local elections—by, for instance, levying taxes and fees on hotel rooms and rental cars. Since
these visitors do not live in the community, they did not benefit (or did not benefit very
much) when the government over-exacted a neighbor. Even residents who pay taxes to the
government may not benefit specifically from that government’s over-exaction.
215 Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 841–42 (1987) (“California is free to
advance its ‘comprehensive program,’ if it wishes, by using its power of eminent domain for
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and a new floodway, but they eventually paid the Dolans for the requisite real es-
tate.216 These were forced sales of property rights by unwilling sellers rather than
uncompensated seizures.217 The government itself did not pay the compensation,
merely serving as a transfer agent.
Reverse exaction compensation would exhibit similar characteristics. The party
suffering an unconstitutional taking of its property would be the rare neighbor
forced to tolerate an exaction so inadequate that it cannot meet the essential nexus
and rough proportionality standards applicable to reverse claims.218 For whatever
reasons, a public agency approved a project that was in the public interest overall
without adequately mitigating its substantial negative impact on others.219 Once a
court finds that the under-exaction worked a taking of the property of one or more
neighbors, First English would automatically require compensation for this tak-
ing.220 To paraphrase Armstrong,221 a court would be barring government from
forcing the public to bear burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne
by specific individuals alone.222 If anything, compensation to a neighbor for a
reverse exaction may be even more justifiable than compensation to an applicant for
a direct exaction.223
Again, though, the government is not acting in an entrepreneurial capacity and
is serving merely as an umpire and go-between. In this case, the true beneficiary of
the taking is the applicant that was able to receive the permit it requested while
this ‘public purpose’ . . . but if it wants an easement across the Nollans’ property, it must pay
for it.” (internal citation omitted)).
216 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 396 (1994) (“A strong public desire to improve the
public condition [will not] warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional
way of paying for the change.” (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922))).
217 In economic terms, this is an interest protected by a liability rule. See Guido Calabresi
& A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972) (defining liability rules).
218 See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547, 555 (2001)
(“[I]f a downzoning of a certain magnitude would not have been considered a regulatory
taking, an upzoning of the same magnitude should not be seen as a giving.”).
219 See Been, supra note 17, at 504–06 (noting the possibility of under-regulation, in-
cluding, perhaps, by jurisdictions that under-regulate as a means of balancing their budgets
without having to increase taxes).
220 482 U.S. 304, 322 (1987).
221 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
222 Cf. id. at 49.
223 In a traditional claim, the applicant is the entity disturbing the status quo, and there is
no taking until the owner elects to change the property’s use in a manner that may harm
others. By contrast, those who suffer reverse exactions do not take any initiative and have
little input into the actions of an applicant that seeks to enrich itself. The applicant’s decision
whether to proceed presumably does not factor in its neighbors’ well-being, which means
that reverse exaction claimants are little more than collateral damage. In short, exaction
claimants act because they believe they will be better off than before, while reverse exaction
claimants respond in the hope that they will be no worse off.
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internalizing only an unconstitutionally tiny portion of the project’s costs.224 The
actual casualties of the taking inflicted by the applicant’s project are those neigh-
bors, not the government agency.225 In such a case, the applicant indirectly took
property interests from its neighbors, with an assist from a government agency that
did not properly perform its role as intermediary.
In this reverse exaction setting, the government body would charge these costs
back to the recipient of the government permit, thereby forcing the permit applicant
to internalize the costs it nearly succeeded in offloading onto its neighbors.226 This
compensation, once again, transforms an involuntary seizure into a forced sale at a
fair market value price, as the Fifth Amendment demands.227 This is precisely what
should have happened all along and what would have happened had the government
calculated the exaction correctly from the outset: the applicant would have paid
more, in the form of the higher cost of a properly calculated exaction, and the neigh-
bors would have suffered less. The beneficiary of the constitutionally inadequate
exaction, in effect, takes property from its neighbors, abetted by the government, and
the process described here ensures that this beneficiary compensates those neighbors
justly for their property.228 This compensation will typically be money but could also
be paid in the form of a property interest such as an easement, just as the govern-
ment might have exacted either money or property from the original applicant.
In fact, this process would mirror the private taking statutes some states have
adopted, under which private parties enjoy limited condemnation power over other
private parties but must pay just compensation for any property right they take.229
224 If the applicant internalizes its externality in a constitutional way, then there is no
reverse exaction and no liability. This will be the outcome in most cases. See supra Section
III.B.1–2. Most exaction claims fail, and most reverse exaction claims will similarly fail.
225 See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 387–88 (1994) (noting how permit
conditions would reduce off-premises effects).
226 The neighbors might elect to use the funds they receive to mitigate the externality the
applicant’s project created or exacerbated, if mitigation is feasible. They might, for instance,
erect a fence, install sound-proofing, or invest in air filters. Or they might simply keep the
money as compensation for a property right that the government appropriated by not exacting
the applicant’s property to constitutional standards: the value of their property dropped, and
they received compensation for this loss of value.
227 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
228 See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 218, at 556 (“When owners have the option to
refuse the benefit of the giving, the state should demand immediate payment of a charge for
the giving. Anyone not wishing to pay the charge has the option of refusing to accept the
giving.”); cf. Karen Bradshaw, Using Takings to Undo Givings, 10 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY
649 (2016) (discussing when the beneficiary of a statute can challenge it).
229 See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 6A.4(2) (2017) (allowing landlocked private owners to take
private property for access to a public road); see also Abraham Bell, Private Takings, 76 U.
CHI. L. REV. 517, 559 (2009) (arguing that private takings should be allowed in certain
circumstances, provided that “payment for the taking must be made by the actual private 
2017] REVERSE EXACTIONS 35
In states lacking such statutes, private parties should not enjoy this power, since
private parties ordinarily have no right to take property from other private parties.
But once the damage is already done, with an assist from a government body that
miscalibrated an exaction, it may no longer be feasible to protect the neighbors’
rights with a property rule—the improvement may already have been completed—
and a liability rule may be the only practical option. The neighbors whose rights
were violated recover from the government, and the government charges the cost
back to the under-exacted applicant that benefited from this error.
This remedial structure mirrors what happens in cases such as Nollan and
Dolan, in which the beneficiaries of a government over-exaction indirectly pay
compensation to the wronged landowner.230 The neighbors of the Nollans and the
Dolans benefited from the government’s over-exaction of those applicants by
enjoying for free property rights that the state or the city should have had to pur-
chase on their behalf with their tax dollars.231 Those same neighbors were later
forced to pay for these takings when the government body had to pay takings com-
pensation.232 Here, the applicant would benefit from the government’s unconstitu-
tionally inadequate exaction and ultimately would be required to compensate its
neighbors for that reverse-exaction taking.
It would be particularly unfair if the government failed to push the cost of a
reverse-exaction taking forward onto the permit applicant that created the externality
and instead paid compensation out of general tax revenues. Tax revenues are raised
from members of the general public, many of whom are the same neighbors suffer-
ing from the government’s inadequate exaction. In other words, if the payment for
a reverse exaction taking simply comes from tax revenues or reserves, the neighbors
would, to some extent, be paying compensation to themselves, particularly if the
taxing jurisdiction is small.233 Meanwhile, the under-exacted applicant would be
creating externalities that it would not have any obligation to remediate beyond its
taker, rather than an intermediary such as the government. This ensures that the taker indeed
values the property right more highly than the previous owner.” (footnote omitted)).
230 See Dolan, 512 U.S. 374; Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
231 See Dolan, 512 U.S. 374; Nollan, 483 U.S. 825.
232 See, e.g., Nollan, 483 U.S. 825.
233 Because the Nollans and the Dolans were presumably taxpayers, they, too, may have
compensated themselves in part. But in those cases, many people—the entire population of
California in Nollan—were paying compensation to a single property owner. Thus, the pro-
portion of the compensation attributable to the Nollans’ own state tax payments, or anyone
else’s, would have been minuscule. In the reverse exaction setting, by contrast, there fre-
quently will be numerous neighbors receiving compensation from a single applicant, and
each neighbor will receive a much smaller amount. If an applicant is polluting the local air,
then everyone in the community is suffering and everyone is entitled to a small amount of
compensation. If that award is funded by local taxes, then the local residents would effec-
tively be compensating themselves for someone else’s wrong. The polluter, meanwhile,
would be allowed to harm others nearly for free.
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pro rata share of municipal tax payments. By judicially forcing this expense back
onto the applicant that created the problem, the reverse exaction claim ensures that
the party that caused the externality is held accountable, which is precisely what the
exaction was supposed to accomplish in the first place. Here, though, a claim by the
applicant’s neighbors is needed to ensure that the externality is internalized fairly,
with a judge ordering a remedy that corrects the land use body’s failures.234
There are numerous precedents for forcing the beneficiaries of government-
mandated improvements to pay for those improvements.235 The most obvious
example is the fact that jurisdictions such as cities and counties levy taxes on real
estate and use these funds to provide standard local government services such as
schools, libraries, and roads. The beneficiaries of the services pay for them. The fit
is not perfect, of course: some beneficiaries, such as transient visitors, may enjoy
services without paying taxes, and some taxpayers, such as absentee owners of
vacant property, may not benefit from the services they are paying for.236 Moreover,
since most property taxes are assessed on an ad valorem basis, the funds come
disproportionately from those who own the most valuable real estate, including
commercial owners that may be taxed at a higher rate while making only limited
direct use of these services.237
This Section previously noted the unfairness of asking the recipients of takings
compensation to remit real estate taxes that are then used to pay the takings compen-
sation they receive.238 Here, however, tax dollars are used to provide broad-based
services that everyone—not just the plaintiff in a takings case—enjoys, and compen-
sation for takings ordinarily makes up only a trivial part of the annual budget. In
234 Cf. William J. (Jack) Jones Ins. Trust v. City of Fort Smith, 731 F. Supp. 912, 914
(W.D. Ark. 1990) (noting, in the course of ruling in favor of a landowner’s exaction claim,
that “Nollan teaches that the City may constitutionally ‘tax’ plaintiff to recoup the costs of
the negative externalities that its increased business activities cause”).
235 Cf. Levinson, supra note 103, at 388–89 (discussing whether mandated compensation
leads to efficient investment by private individuals).
236 School systems are costly to operate, but the school bus does not pick up any students
at the factory door. Non-owner residents such as renters pay taxes indirectly, since the rent
their landlords charge presumably factors in all costs of providing the housing, including real
estate taxes the landlord must pay. Others may pay even more indirectly and in smaller
amounts: transient visitors enjoying limited municipal services as they pass through a city
may pay something in the form of highway tolls, gasoline taxes, and sales taxes on incidental
purchases, for instance. But at least as a first approximation, the local population pays taxes
to cover the costs of services that benefit the local population. Taxpayers living in jurisdictions
that levy taxes at lower rates presumably are willing to live with a lower level of service.
237 See, e.g., How We Tax Your Property, CITY OF BOSTON, http://www.cityofboston.gov
/assessing/taxrates.asp [https://perma.cc/PW7K-A54Y] (last visited Oct. 22, 2017) (noting
that “[t]he City of Boston operates under a property tax classification system. This allows us
to charge different rates for residential and commercial property,” and setting forth the 2017
rate of $10.59 per thousand dollars of value for residential property and $25.37 for com-
mercial, industrial, and personal property).
238 See supra notes 233–34 and accompanying text.
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fact, the contrast between this use of tax revenues and the use discussed above
highlights a critical distinction. In this case, broad-based revenues support widely
used public services enjoyed by much of the general population, while in the pre-
vious discussion, broad-based revenues would be used, inappropriately, to compen-
sate the general public for a community-wide loss that it suffers.239
Of course, real property taxes are broad-based charges that must be paid by all
property owners, just as income taxes are paid by all parties who earn income and
sales taxes are paid by all who spend. Taxes are the price the government charges
residents and businesses for a wide array of services that everyone enjoys to some
degree, and they are imposed legislatively. Reverse exaction compensation, by
contrast, will be paid only by the particular owner or small group of owners that
benefited from an unconstitutionally weak exaction, and it will be court-ordered.
That party enjoyed an undeserved gain when it received a permit with conditions
attached that were inadequate to internalize the externalities the owner caused. That
owner, moreover, probably received that undeserved gain on a one-off basis, as a
result of individualized negotiations with a permitting body as part of the adminis-
trative approval process.
State subdivision laws might offer a closer parallel to the structure proposed
here.240 When a developer subdivides agricultural property and creates thirty resi-
dential lots, for example, a typical state subdivision law will mandate that the
developer build the infrastructure that the subdivision will require.241 Local jurisdic-
tions do not want to pay the expense for these infrastructure improvements out of
general tax revenues or utility fees, presumably because they do not want every
resident to have to pay for improvements that are designed to enrich one particular
landowner.242 The developer must obtain final subdivision approval from the
239 The most extreme example of this phenomenon would be a government that increases
its tax rate to 100% of market value and then condemns all the real estate within its borders,
using the funds it just raised to pay compensation to the former owners of this land. Tax-
payers, who would pay differing amounts reflecting the relative value of their real estate,
would receive compensation in the same proportion as the money they had just paid and
would lose their property along the way.
240 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-3-403(a)–(b) (2017) (permitting regional planning
commissions to condition subdivision approval on provision of roads, utilities, and other
infrastructure). To the extent subdivision laws such as this build exactions into the approval
process, these exactions are imposed legislatively rather than negotiated administratively in
each individual case.
241 See, e.g., id. This infrastructure typically includes essential facilities such as streets,
sidewalks, electricity, water, cable television and internet, and storm and sanitary sewers.
Some jurisdictions go further than this. See, e.g., Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429
(Cal. 1996) (discussing validity of mitigation fees imposed in lieu of developer’s provision
of recreational facilities and public art).
242 In the course of ruling in favor of the exacted landowner, the Dolan Court observed
without comment that the City of Tigard’s drainage plan required property owners along the
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relevant land use body,243 and that body will condition its approval on the subdi-
vider’s provision of those services, often secured by a bond.244 The subdivider
presumably pushes these costs forward by pricing them into the lots and the finished
homes to be built on them. The ultimate purchaser thereby pays a price that reflects
the cost of all services and facilities the new home necessitated. Subdivision laws,
in effect, build in exactions legislatively. The community as a whole is not forced
to bear the external costs that a developer has generated; the developer profits with-
out imposing capital costs on neighbors.245 An even closer parallel might be to
special taxing districts or to assessments for particular improvements.246 Rather than
the entire city paying to improve the entire city, districts such as these localize both
the problem and the solution by allowing assessments on one area to fund improve-
ments in just that area.247
Utility assessments operate in a similar way, with entities such as utilities
charging fees or assessments against particular lots that benefit from specific new
construction. A water company may replace an aging sanitary sewer with a new line
and assess the owners who benefit by imposing a sewer-improvement fee on their
utility bills for the next thirty years. Economically, this differs little from forcing
these owners to replace their own sewer and take out a thirty-year mortgage to cover
the cost, but given the community nature of the improvement, the assessment struc-
ture is more practical. By acting in this way, the utility ensures that the parties using
the new facility are the parties that pay for building it.
This portion of this Article’s proposal is also in accord with the academic
literature on “givings.”248 In their seminal article on the subject, Professors Bell and
Parchomovsky use a state’s elimination of development restrictions on wetlands as
an illustration of a government “regulatory giving.”249 Holders of wetlands property
receive a gratuitous benefit, while neighbors pay the cost in the form of reduced
affected waterways to pay a disproportionately high share of the cost of the city’s improve-
ments, given that they would enjoy a disproportionately high share of the benefits. 512 U.S.
374, 378–79 (1994).
243 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-3-403(b) (2017).
244 See, e.g., id.
245 The cost of maintaining these newly enlarged systems will be marginally higher than
it was when they were smaller. But the tax base will also increase, since it has just been
expanded by replacing one agricultural lot with thirty new residential ones. That is not
unusual and is the hallmark of a healthy, growing community.
246 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 7-84-401 (2017) (allowing municipalities to levy special
assessments against properties located within a central business improvement district).
247 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 7-84-203 (2017) (describing which properties may be
included in a central business improvement district).
248 See generally Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 218, at 549–50 (“Givings are ever-
present and yet not discussed. They can be found in almost every field of government
endeavor related to property.”).
249 Id. at 550–51.
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quality of life.250 Had the authors said “relaxation” instead of “elimination,” they
might have been describing the facts in Koontz, in which the applicant sought per-
mission to develop his lot in a way that would potentially harm his neighbors.251 The
government agency proposed an exaction that the Court later held to be subject to
the Nollan and Dolan standards.252 Had the government, fearing liability for an im-
proper exaction, proposed a far weaker exaction, the neighbors might have viewed this
as an inappropriate giving to Koontz, which is effectively an unremedied reverse
exaction.253 Most relevant here, Bell and Parchomovsky would require that the
beneficiaries of givings compensate the owners whose property is taken, particularly
if the property was taken specifically for the purpose of a giving.254 Such an ap-
proach would weed out unwarranted windfalls.255
Most significantly, nuisance law doctrine has long mandated that those who
unreasonably interfere with the property rights of their neighbors make those neigh-
bors whole.256 The entire body of nuisance law is predicated on the recognition that
one owner’s use of property can unreasonably interfere with another owner’s.257
250 See id.
251 Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2592–93 (2013).
252 See id. at 2593–94.
253 See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 218, at 552 (asking whether General Motors
could have been required to pay for a giving on the facts of Poletown Neighborhood Council
v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981), overruled by County of Wayne v.
Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004)).
254 Id. at 555–56; see also id. at 597 (“[W]hen compensable takings are associated with
chargeable givings, the recipients of the giving should compensate the victims of the taking.”);
id. at 609–12 (discussing how their proposed “law of givings” might resolve many of the
unfairness problems that exactions create). The authors suggest that the law of givings might
be a branch of constitutional law, implicit in the Takings Clause. Id. at 551 n.16.
255 See Eric Kades, Windfalls, 108 YALE L.J. 1489, 1492 (1999) (“Some legal rules
do—and should—dictate that the state capture windfalls, i.e., tax them away from their lucky
recipients and redistribute the gains to the rest of the population.”); Saul Levmore, Takings,
Torts, and Special Interests, 77 VA. L. REV. 1333, 1355 (1991) (“One solution to this prob-
lem is the normative suggestion . . . that those who benefit from government interventions
should be made to pay those who are burdened. In theory, such a requirement would
perfectly encourage desirable projects and discourage inefficient or corrupt interventions.”
(footnote omitted)); see also Jianlin Chen, Curbing Rent-Seeking and Inefficiency with Broad
Takings Powers and Undercompensation: The Case of Singapore from a Givings Per-
spective, 19 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 1, 28–46 (2010) (describing how Singapore recoups
some of the gains property owners receive from government givings).
256 See generally Denise E. Antolini, Modernizing Public Nuisance: Solving the Paradox
of the Special Injury Rule, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 755, 767–71 (2001) (discussing American
nuisance law, its roots in medieval England, and the modern distinction between public and
private nuisance).
257 For a recent discussion of incompatible nearby land uses outside of the exactions con-
text, see Kris Maher, Missouri Levee Raises Questions, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2016, at A3
(quoting the mayor of Fenton, Missouri, as saying: “‘I hate to put those people back underwater
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Courts and commentators have long recognized the problems that incompatible
adjacencies create.258 A party found to have created a nuisance has committed a tort
and must pay damages to its plaintiff neighbor. Judges deciding nuisance cases must
struggle to find a baseline, a prerequisite to determining exactly which owner is
interfering with the other’s—presumed “normal”—use.259 But judges deciding ex-
action and reverse exaction cases will avoid much of that dilemma, since neither
type of claim can succeed unless the government has miscalculated its exaction by
a wide mark. Even if a court cannot figure out precisely what the baseline, non-
nuisance use is, most exactions fall in the central, “close enough” portion of the bell
curve that does not lead to compensation for either party.
Moreover, land use laws, and particularly zoning laws, have long been recog-
nized as little more than prospectively adopted anti-nuisance legislation. The Su-
preme Court’s first foray into zoning law, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,260
relied heavily on the law of nuisance in rejecting a facial challenge to a fairly typical
new zoning law.261 The Euclid Court found that “the foundation . . . of the common
law of nuisances, ordinarily will furnish a fairly helpful clew [sic]”262 as to whether
a given zoning ordinance is valid. The Court observed that “the law of nuisances . . .
may be consulted, not for the purpose of controlling, but for the helpful aid of its
analogies in the process of ascertaining the scope of, the [police] power.”263 It noted
that zoning law, like nuisance law, is context-specific.264 The opinion included the
that finally get to live in almost a flood-free area now.’ But that might not be fair to others,
he added. ‘What right do you have to push water onto someone else?’”).
258 LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND POWER 97
(2003) (“[N]uisance is not . . . some kind of ‘exception’ to the otherwise broad and un-
assailable power of property rights. Rather, it is simply one manifestation of a very basic
principle: that the normative basis for the presumed superiority of a property right . . . fails
when it is opposed by a public interest that involves values of a similar kind.” (footnote
omitted)); Lisa Grow Sun & Brigham Daniels, Mirrored Externalities, 90 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 135, 138 (2014) (“[A]ny potential decision that implicates externalities can be de-
scribed, alternatively, as acting or failing to act and thus can be framed as creating either
negative or positive externalities.”); Sax, supra note 67, at 153 (“Surely there is no theory
of property rights that suggests that property owners should have an advantage in conflict
resolution merely because of superior physical position . . . .”).
259 This issue arises throughout takings law. See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson, Resetting the
Baseline of Ownership: Takings and Investor Expectations After the Bailouts, 75 MD. L.
REV. 722, 724 (2016) (noting, after judicial rejection of several takings claims arising from
government bailouts in the financial services industry, that “going forward, officials facing
future panics can have greater confidence to take the steps necessary to stop financial wild-
fires without fear of liability.” (footnote omitted)).
260 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
261 Id.
262 Id. at 387.
263 Id. at 387–88.
264 Id. at 388 (citation omitted):
[T]he question whether the power exists to forbid the erection of a
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much-quoted statement that “[a] nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong
place,—like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard.”265
The Euclid Court cited earlier state court opinions noting that businesses in resi-
dential neighborhoods may amount to nuisances.266 And it even went so far as to note
that, in certain settings, a residential apartment building might constitute a nuisance.267
The entire basis for the Court’s upholding of this first-generation zoning ordinance
is its recognition that zoning law—unsuccessfully challenged as revolutionary by
Ambler Realty—is merely an extension of the venerable common law of nuisance.268
If anything, permit applicants that benefit from exactions that are constitution-
ally too weak and that are later called on to provide restitution to government bodies
for the compensation they must pay to neighbors should be grateful that the neigh-
bors did not seek to have their use of the property enjoined entirely under nuisance
law. A useful example of this distinction is the well-known case of Boomer v.
Atlantic Cement Company,269 in which the New York Court of Appeals found that
the defendant factory was committing an ongoing nuisance by forcing its neighbors
to endure dirt, smoke, and vibrations.270 Under traditional nuisance law, the neigh-
bors would have been entitled to an injunction against the continuation of these
harmful activities.271
Had the court issued this injunction, the only options available to the factory
would have been to cease operations or to purchase an easement to pollute from the
plaintiffs.272 Such a negotiation raises huge collective action problems, given that the
neighbors were a large group with potentially divergent goals, and also given the
building of a particular kind or for a particular use, like the question
whether a particular thing is a nuisance, is to be determined, not by
an abstract consideration of the building or of the thing considered
apart, but by considering it in connection with the circumstances and
the locality.
265 Id.
266 Id. at 390–93 (citing state cases).
267 Id. at 394–95 (“Under these circumstances, apartment houses, which in a different en-
vironment would be not only entirely unobjectionable but highly desirable, come very near to
being nuisances.”). The Court also refers to some apartment houses located in districts of de-
tached homes as “mere parasite[s], constructed in order to take advantage of the open spaces
and attractive surroundings created by the residential character of the district.” Id. at 394.
268 Commentators have also long noted this parallel between land use regulations such as
zoning ordinances and the law of nuisance. See, e.g., Sax, supra note 67, at 150 (describing
property “as an interdependent network of competing uses, rather than as a number of inde-
pendent and isolated entities”).
269 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970).
270 Id. at 871–72.
271 Id. at 872 (noting that traditional doctrine holds that “where a nuisance has been found
and where there has been any substantial damage shown by the party complaining an in-
junction will be granted”).
272 See id. at 872–73.
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likelihood of extreme ill will between the parties by the time the litigation was re-
solved. But even if the factory had been able to surmount these problems, it would
have been forced to agree to whatever price the neighbors demanded, unless that
price exceeded the value of continuing to operate, in which case the factory would
simply shut its doors. In short, if the court had issued an injunction, it would have
protected the neighbors’ rights with a property rule and placed the factory owners
in the position of having to accede to whatever terms the neighbors set.273
Recognizing these challenges, however, the court refused to enjoin the contin-
ued operation of the factory and instead awarded damages to the plaintiffs, because
“to follow the rule literally . . . would be to close down the plant at once.”274 There
was apparently no technical method available for abating the nuisance,275 and the
court wished to avoid the inefficiency of shutting the plant down altogether.276 The
neighbors won their case, but the court elected to protect their rights with only a
liability rule,277 namely an award set by the court rather than an easement price set
by the neighbors themselves or never agreed to at all.278
Permit applicants forced to reimburse government bodies for the costs of
successful reverse exaction claims will be unhappy having to pay more for their
permit than they initially thought. On reflection, though, they should be grateful that
they did not face the injunction that the Boomer dissent would have imposed in
accordance with the common law of nuisance.279 Permit applicants in the reverse
exaction setting receive the permits they desire, though with constitutionally in-
adequate conditions attached, and are later forced to pay compensation to the
neighbors whose property rights their change in use has damaged. As disappointing
as that later payment may be, those applicants nearly always would choose that option
over an outright permit denial and would have done so had they confronted that
same choice on day one.280 Moreover, one can only assume that the permit applicant
273 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 217, at 1105–06 (citing Boomer, 257 N.E.2d 870).
274 Boomer, 257 N.E.2d at 873.
275 Id.
276 “Respondent’s investment in the plant is in excess of $45,000,000. There are over 300
people employed there.” Id. at 873 n.*.
277 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 217, at 1105–06.
278 Boomer, 257 N.E.2d at 873 (“[T]o grant the injunction unless defendant pays plaintiffs
such permanent damages as may be fixed by the court seems to do justice between the
contending parties.”).
279 “[T]he majority is, in effect, licensing a continuing wrong. It is the same as saying to
the cement company, you may continue to do harm to your neighbors so long as you pay a
fee for it.” Id. at 876 (Jasen, J., dissenting). See generally Christopher Serkin, Existing Uses
and the Limits of Land Use Regulations, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1222, 1282 (2009) (concluding,
in the takings context, “that the categorical protection of existing uses extends more protection
than appropriate in at least some cases”).
280 In rare cases, the compensation these applicants must pay may make the project eco-
nomically unfeasible, because its overall cost, including the external damages it imposes on
2017] REVERSE EXACTIONS 43
would rather pay a damage award established by a court than face the vagaries of
a nuisance claim brought by its neighbors, including the uncertainty of whether
those neighbors will sell an easement to the applicant and at what price.
In short, any property owner that applies for a land use permit and later accepts
a very favorable exaction does so with full knowledge that it later may be charged
for the costs it imposes on its neighbors, just as it knows it may face a nuisance
claim brought by its neighbors under the law of torts.281 In each of these cases, the
applicant is not losing anything when it later pays these additional amounts. Rather,
it enjoys less of a gain than it had hoped for, while reimbursing its neighbors for its
interference with their property rights.282 Owners also should remember that an agency
occasionally may reverse its granting of a permit, or a court may revoke the per-
mit.283 This might happen even if the applicant has commenced construction of its
project.284 These actions are certainly less desirable to the owner than having to pay
compensation to its neighbors.
In those extremely rare cases in which a reverse exaction claim succeeds, the
court would be finding that the applicant’s neighbors suffered a constitutional
neighbors, exceeds its overall benefit. In cases such as this, the project never should have
been allowed to proceed in the first place, as the applicant probably should have known from
the outset. Stated differently, if the applicant had actually owned all the neighboring land its
new development would injure, it would not have proceeded. There is no reason such an
applicant should be allowed to proceed just because it is in a position to offload those costs
onto others, and there is no reason the neighbors should be forced to bear those costs. Any
applicant with a proposal that is so inefficient, and that so harms its neighbors, deserves little
judicial sympathy, assuming it can even get its proposal approved by a land use agency. See
Levinson, supra note 86, at 401–02.
281 See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 218, at 600 (“The involvement of the
government should not blind one to the underlying quasi-tortious situation—the taking of
one’s private property by another.”).
282 The legal standards for nuisance claims and takings claims differ, so it is entirely pos-
sible that a given plaintiff might prevail on one type of claim but not the other. This does not
change the fact that land use laws such as zoning laws are often seen as little more than
advance attempts to head off potential nuisances down the road. See supra notes 260–68 and
accompanying text.
283 See, e.g., McAllister v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 87 Cal. Rptr. 3d 365, 388 (Ct. App. 2009)
(“Since approval of the Project rests, in part, on that erroneous finding, it follows, and we
conclude, that the Commission abused its discretion in approving the Project and granting
the coastal development permit. Therefore, the approval cannot stand, and the matter must
be remanded to the Commission . . . .”).
284 Cf. id. at 392–93:
[W]hen a developer starts a project without any permit or under an
invalid permit—i.e., one that was issued in violation of existing zoning
or environmental laws—the developer does not gain a vested right to
complete the project; and, in the latter situation, the government is not
estopped from challenging the validity of the permit even if the de-
velopers expended resources in reliance on it.
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violation and that the applicant received an undeserved and unwarranted benefit—a
government “giving.”285 In such a case, the party receiving that inappropriate benefit—
here, the applicant enjoying a government-imposed condition that did not exact
enough—would have to make the victim of this impropriety whole, presumably by
paying compensation in an amount equal to the value of the under-exaction. The
initial claim would be a takings claim brought by the neighbors against the govern-
ment body that under-exacted. But that government entity would be entitled to resti-
tution from the applicant rather than having to pay the award out of public funds. In
the end, the government should break even, just as it does in a traditional exaction
claim in which it pays the award to the owner whose property was over-exacted out
of taxpayer funds (disregarding, in either case, transactions costs such as legal fees).
States would have to develop appropriate procedures for resolving these claims.
The claim that an unsuccessful government defendant brings seeking reimbursement
from the permit applicant that caused the government’s loss might be commenced
shortly after the government is found liable to the neighbors. More likely, though,
a government defendant in a reverse exaction claim would want to bring in the ap-
plicant as a third-party defendant in the original claim. The applicant facing a pos-
sible restitution claim similarly will want to participate in the initial takings claim
against the government, given that it will be called on to reimburse the government
for any compensation it must pay to the neighbors. That applicant was involved in
the facts as they developed and will probably participate in the initial claim as a
witness anyway. Conversely, the government may feel that it is likely to break even
no matter how the neighbors’ case turns out and thus may have less incentive to
defend vigorously against the neighbors than the applicant that will ultimately pay
any judgment. The court will prefer resolving these issues together rather than
separately, both to avoid inconsistent results and to conserve judicial resources. This
consolidated approach also reduces the legal expenses the parties will face. State
courts and state legislatures can work out the best procedures for handling reverse
exaction claims—perhaps at the administrative level and not only in court—just as
they established procedures for inverse condemnation claims when federal courts
so required.286
Note that reverse exaction claims pursuing just compensation differ from claims
by neighbors in which those neighbors seek to enjoin or invalidate government
action. In Municipal Art Society v. City of New York,287 the trial court voided a
285 See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 218, at 554 (“[I]t is inequitable to bestow a
benefit upon some people that, in all fairness and justice, should be given to the public as a
whole.”); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1849, 1884 (2007) (“[C]onferring benefits on a select few is not regarded as a
morally acceptable use of the state’s power of coercion.” (footnote omitted)).
286 See Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194–97
(1985).
287 522 N.Y.S.2d 800 (Sup. Ct. 1987).
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transaction in which the city agreed to provide the buyer of a publicly owned parcel
with a 20% zoning bonus in exchange for a $57 million higher sale price plus the
buyer’s agreement to make $35–40 million in improvements to an adjacent subway
station.288 The agreement was rejected in large part because the extra money was not
earmarked for local improvements.289 The plaintiff persuaded the court that this
transaction was merely the costly sale of a zoning bonus to a private developer,290
an argument that might be raised in opposition to many exactions. In part, Municipal
Art Society may illustrate the distinction highlighted above between government as
entrepreneur and government as referee, given that the city was proposing the sale
of a very desirable parcel of midtown real estate that it owned for a higher price than
it otherwise could have. But even if the proposed transaction had not involved a sale
and the city had simply granted a zoning bonus to a private owner in exchange for
the promise of privately financed subway improvements, this case was a straightfor-
ward effort by neighbors to stop a project they oppose. They did not seek compensa-
tion for a loss they had suffered; rather, they succeeded in preventing any such loss
from occurring.
4. Nollan and Dolan as Illustrations
Nollan and Dolan themselves serve as useful illustrations of how reverse
exaction claims might succeed or fail.291 Imagine that the California Coastal Com-
mission had allowed the Nollans to proceed with their initial development plans and
had imposed only a trivial exaction on them. The Nollans would have had no cause
to bring a takings claim—they obtained the permit they requested with an acceptable
exaction attached to it—but others might object to the Commission’s imposition of
an exaction that they view as inadequate. The first issue to arise under this Article’s
proposal would be the identification of the parties who are harmed and thus might
become plaintiffs in a reverse exaction claim. To bring a successful takings claim,
a potential plaintiff must have been unconstitutionally deprived of a valid property
interest;292 if a neighbor simply dislikes the project, she lacks the standing needed
to bring a takings claim.
The Commission asserted three state interests in the case: protection of the pub-
lic’s view of the beach, assistance in overcoming the public’s psychological barrier
to beach use that a heavily developed beachfront road would create, and prevention
288 Id. at 800–02.
289 Id. at 803.
290 Id. at 804 (“[G]overnment may not place itself in the position of reaping a cash
premium because one of its agencies bestows a zoning benefit upon a developer. Zoning
benefits are not cash items.”).
291 See generally Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
292 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834–36.
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of congestion.293 It is not entirely clear that any of these interests represent protected
property rights enjoyed by neighbors or anyone else. If none of these three interests
constitutes a property right, then no one could bring a reverse exaction claim and that
would be the end of the discussion. These may be valid goals for a state agency to pur-
sue, they may give unhappy neighbors the ability to bring some type of claim against
the agency under another constitutional provision or under state law, they may support
a nuisance claim by the neighbors against the Nollans, but they do not appear to im-
plicate the Takings Clause.294 In other words, the Commission may have been protect-
ing public rights, but these are not property rights that can serve as the basis for a
reverse exaction claim or any other type of takings claim under the Fifth Amendment.295
The Nollan example illustrates several features of the reverse exaction test. First,
the plaintiff must possess a property interest that has been taken.296 Unless California
recognizes a view of the beach, the absence of a psychological barrier to the use of
the beach, or the absence of congestion as property rights, then a reverse exaction
suit cannot proceed.297 Second, parties who have been wronged may be able to bring
other types of claims. A disappointed tourist might have a claim under the Due
Process Clause,298 for example, or state law may provide a remedy.299 In this in-
stance, the displeased neighbor will have a claim, but not a reverse exaction claim.300
Third, in some cases, the interests that individuals lose may be too trifling to
protect in any practical way. This is not to suggest that interests of modest value are
not safeguarded by the Fifth Amendment or in other ways.301 Moreover, while each
tourist’s view might be impaired to only the tiniest degree, the collective loss of all
the tourists in coastal California might be huge. Practically speaking, though, each
potential plaintiff will likely conclude that a loss so minor is not worth constitutional
293 Id. at 835.
294 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
295 Note that Koontz prevailed even though he was not deprived of any property interest.
Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2596 (2013) (“Extortionate
demands for property in the land-use permitting context run afoul of the Takings Clause not
because they take property but because they impermissibly burden the right not to have
property taken without just compensation.”). The Court’s statement could be read to imply
that reverse exaction claims need not fail solely because the neighbor did not lose a property
interest. Cf. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992) (“[I]t is clear that in
suits against the Government, at least, the concrete injury requirement must remain.”).
296 See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834–36.
297 See id. at 835–36.
298 U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
299 See, e.g., Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2597–98 (discussing possible state law claims).
300 See, e.g., Miller v. Town of Wenham, 833 F.3d 46, 53–55 (1st Cir. 2016) (recognizing,
in a due process case, that a resident may have a local ordinance enforced under Massachusetts
law even though a local official chose not to enforce that ordinance directly).
301 See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (pro-
tecting owner against physical occupation of one-eighth of one cubic foot of her roof by
cable television equipment).
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litigation, and class actions are unlikely in these settings, given the modest loss each
potential claimant suffers and the likelihood that each neighbor will present slightly
different facts and losses.302 In the variation of Nollan posited above, the Nollans
would have appropriated public rights with an assist from the California Coastal
Commission, but those rights are so diffuse that there is no practical way to defend
them outside of the political sphere.
Dolan, by contrast, presents a factual setting in which a neighbor might bring
a successful reverse exaction claim. In Dolan, the city’s concerns focused on
increases in traffic and stormwater runoff that a store expansion might inflict on the
applicants’ neighbors.303 Suppose the City of Tigard had allowed the Dolans to
proceed with their project on the condition that they make some modest modifica-
tion to their plans. The Dolans then might have built their larger store, expanded
their parking lot, and replaced the gravel of the original lot with pavement. As a
result, more stormwater would fall on impermeable surfaces and flow into a neigh-
boring creek rather than absorbing directly into the ground on the Dolans’ lot, just
as the city feared in the actual case.304 But in this hypothetical variation, the city’s
exaction is inadequate to offset these negative effects on the Dolans’ neighbors.
A neighbor might well succeed with a reverse exaction claim on these facts. The
neighbor’s argument would be that the city’s inadequate exaction took a property
interest from her, namely the right to hold her property free of excessive rainwater
runoff from neighboring land. The Court in the actual case would not permit Tigard
to exact a fee simple in a strip of the Dolans’ land without demonstrating an essen-
tial nexus and rough proportionality.305 A court facing this hypothetical variation of
the facts would not permit the city to impose an easement for increased stormwater
runoff on neighboring property without making the reverse exaction equivalent of
these same two showings.306
Technically, of course, the neighbors in this hypothetical Dolan variation do not
have their property “exacted,” since they were not a party to the initial compromise
302 It is entirely possible that some neighbors will suffer large losses, others will suffer
more modest losses, and still others will enjoy gains. The net impact on a neighborhood may
be negative, but individual gains and losses can be distributed in a wide range of ways. In
a reverse exaction setting, no one neighbor may possess adequate incentives to spearhead
litigation, each neighbor might present slightly different facts, and class actions may not be
available or practicable.
303 512 U.S. 374, 381–83 (1994).
304 See id.
305 Id. at 392–96.
306 Similarly, the Boomer plaintiffs were entitled to a nuisance remedy unless Atlantic
Cement could demonstrate that it had internalized the various externalities that the facts of
that case presented, which it could not do. Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y.
1970). Sadly for the plaintiffs, however, the New York court protected their property rights
with only an award of damages and not with the injunctive relief they sought. See supra
notes 269–78 and accompanying text.
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that led to the grant of the permit. The exaction occurred earlier, when the Dolans
accepted the conditions proposed by the city in exchange for receipt of their permit,
and this negotiation likely involved only the Dolans and the city. The neighbors,
rather, are victims of an occupation of their property by increased stormwater runoff,
an occupation that does not meet the traditional definition of an exaction. But this
incursion meets this Article’s definition of a reverse exaction because it was caused
by the city’s imposition of an inadequate condition in response to the Dolans’ permit
request. By failing to exact the Dolans sufficiently, the city has, in effect, forced an
unconstitutional compromise on their neighbors.307 The city allows the Dolans to
expand their store, and the external effects on neighboring property are supposed to
be internalized by this transaction. The condition does not internalize the externality
to constitutional standards, however, and this Article’s reverse exaction analysis is
triggered. Unless the city can meet the two-pronged reverse exaction test, it must
pay compensation to the neighbors for a reverse exaction.
In this case, unlike in the “reverse-Nollan” hypothetical discussed above,308
there is unquestionably a property interest at stake: the neighbors are arguing that
the city has forced them to give up a flowage easement without compensation. Under
the first prong of the reverse exaction test, the court would inquire whether the
exaction substantially advances the unquestionably legitimate state interest of miti-
gating increases in flooding.309 If the condition does not accomplish this goal, then
the plaintiff neighbors would prevail by meeting the first prong of the reverse
exaction test. An applicant sought permission to develop property in a way that
would create a flooding externality; the government responded to that request by
inadequately internalizing this externality; and the applicant’s neighbors unconstitu-
tionally must relinquish a property right without compensation. The neighbors’
reverse exaction claim, pursuing compensation for this taking, would succeed.
If, however, the city were to survive this first prong of the reverse exaction test,
as it usually will, the neighbors also may be able to prevail under the reverse of the
Dolan standard, by demonstrating that the magnitude of the city’s weak exaction is
not roughly proportional to the scope of the problem the Dolans’ expansion plans
will create. Here, the court does not examine the linkage between the exaction and
the problem it is meant to address; rather, it focuses on the exaction’s magnitude.310
The Dolan Court does not require mathematical precision, but if we imagine a very
weak exaction, it is possible that the neighbors might be able to demonstrate that the
imposition is not roughly proportional. In this case, their claim would succeed.
307 Cf. Coppi v. City of Dana Point, No. SACV 11-1813 JGB (RNBx), 2014 WL 12589639
(C.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2014), at *5 (“This trial could not turn into a ‘Nollan/Dolan trial’ for the
simple reason that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine would apply to the developer, but
not Plaintiff. The developer is not bringing an action against a governmental unit; therefore
this doctrine does not apply.”).
308 See supra Section III.B.4.
309 See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987).
310 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 395–96.
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If the neighbors prevail under either or both of these standards, they would be
entitled to compensation from the City of Tigard.311 The neighbors will have demon-
strated that the city’s approval of the Dolans’ permit application with inadequate
conditions attached took their property right to be free of stormwater runoff. By
approving the permit as it did, the city will have allowed the Dolans to damage others,
thereby taking their property under the reverse Nollan/Dolan standard.312 The city
would then be able to seek reimbursement from the Dolans, as described above—in
fact, it may already have begun to do so.
This reimbursement might take the form of a tort claim in which the city pursues
damages for the financial injury the Dolans’ project proximately caused the city.313
Those damages would arise as a result of the city’s obligation to compensate the
Dolans’ neighbors for the additional flooding they must endure because the city al-
lowed the Dolans to proceed. Alternatively, the reimbursement might take the form
of a special tax imposed on those landowners whose actions have depleted the public
coffers.314 Tigard might form a special tax district and assess a flood-prevention tax
on those landowners whose real estate development activities have increased the public
need for mitigation measures—a group not necessarily limited just to the Dolans.315
Courts and legislatures would have to develop procedures for allowing claims
of this sort to proceed, just as they have done for inverse condemnation cases.316
Specific reimbursement procedures might vary from state to state, but state legisla-
tures and courts are capable of developing these procedures if substantive case law
requires them to do so.317 Once reverse exaction claims are widely recognized, per-
mitting bodies will learn to include language in their permit approvals in which the
applicant acknowledges that, in the event that a neighbor brings a successful reverse
exaction claim, that applicant is required to provide restitution to the jurisdiction for
any court-ordered takings compensation.
A neighbor would face the choice of bringing a traditional nuisance or trespass
claim, a reverse exaction claim, or, potentially, both. These claims would pursue
311 See supra Section III.B.3.
312 See supra Section III.B.
313 Cf. Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194–97
(1985); supra note 286 and accompanying text.
314 See supra notes 246–47 and accompanying text.
315 Other property owners might have received permits with similarly weak exactions
attached at about the same time, which means that their projects, too, increased the need for
mitigation efforts. In fact, these other owners might be required to reimburse the city for sep-
arate reverse exaction awards if other neighbor-plaintiffs come forward. Or nearby owners
might be required to pay mitigation fees ahead of any development on their property, out of
recognition that similar development of their land in the future will further exacerbate the
flooding problem.
316 See Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n, 473 U.S. at 194–97; see also supra note
286 and accompanying text.
317 See, e.g., Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n, 473 U.S. at 194–97.
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different defendants, would raise somewhat different elements, would lead to differ-
ent remedies, and might face different standing and ripeness requirements. And even
though the government that loses a reverse exaction claim can pursue reimburse-
ment from the permit applicant, it certainly will prefer to head off a reverse exaction
claim entirely. It would rather avoid litigation than risk losing a case in which the
best possible outcome is to break even while bearing litigation costs, and there is
always the possibility that the permit applicant will be unable to satisfy a judgment
for restitution.318 Thus, these different claims also generate different deterrent ef-
fects. An applicant that fears liability to its neighbors may elect to proceed more
carefully. Governments that fear reverse exaction liability may propose more bal-
anced exactions.
5. Ways in Which Reverse Exactions May Not Precisely Mirror Traditional
Exactions
This Article has asserted that a reverse exaction claim is the mirror image of a
traditional exaction claim arising under Nollan and Dolan. That is true only to a
point, and this Section will note the ways in which the two types of claims are not
precise inverses of one another. None of these distinctions undercut the major
argument of this Article: courts should recognize reverse exaction claims just as they
have recognized direct exaction claims. In fact, some of these divergences further
strengthen the argument in favor of judicial recognition of reverse exaction claims.
It is important to recognize, though, that the property owner that initially seeks a
permit holds several substantive, strategic, and institutional advantages over the
neighbors who may object to the government’s granting of that permit. As a result,
exaction claims and reverse exaction claims are somewhat asymmetrical, and the
former are likely to arise considerably more often than the latter.
The applicant is the party that initially formulates plans that disturb the status
quo. Thus, only the applicant gets to decide what to propose and when to propose
it. The applicant chooses exactly what features to incorporate into its initial applica-
tion, including any ways in which it will voluntarily offset externalities that the
applicant acknowledges its development will produce or worsen. The applicant can
also include features in its application that it knows the government is unlikely to
approve, perhaps with the intention of abandoning these features later so that it
appears to be reasonable.
Institutionally, only the applicant negotiates with the relevant government agen-
cies during the preliminary stages of the approval process. Thus, if the government
responds to the initial application by requesting concessions, the applicant gets to
agree to some, reject others, and suggest counterproposals. This ongoing negotiation
318 The applicant owns the real estate in question, of course. But real estate developers
tend to be highly leveraged, and it would not be surprising if the developer had insufficient
equity in the property to satisfy a judgment for restitution in favor of the government.
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is conducted by two parties—the applicant and the government body—with neigh-
bors having little or no input. At the earliest stages of the process, neighbors may not
even know that the landowner has applied. By the time the neighbors learn that the
government is considering an application, the applicant and the permitting agency
may have already cut a preliminary deal or at least established significant momen-
tum in that direction.
The applicant is far more likely than the neighbors to be a repeat player. Those
who develop real estate are often career real estate experts with far greater experi-
ence and familiarity with the permitting process than most of their neighbors. They
probably have established alliances with others in the local business community and
in local government. They are likely to be represented by counsel skilled in working
with government agencies in the jurisdiction.319
Once the negotiations have proceeded to a significant degree, it is the applicant
that ultimately makes the decision whether to accept any proposed conditions, nego-
tiate further, or throw in the towel. Neighbors may have some input by this stage of
the application process and occasionally can kill a proposal completely or influence
the government body.320 But with regard to those proposals that survive this process—
however much they may have been modified along the way—it is the applicant
alone that ultimately must either accede to the conditions or reject them. The dis-
satisfied applicant also gets to decide whether to bring an exaction claim.
Neighbors, by contrast, enjoy few of these advantages and can exercise them
only much later in the administrative process. They are functioning in a reactive
capacity, often learning of the developer’s plans long after the applicant began to
incubate and pursue them. The neighbors will likely have limited time to reflect on
these plans and respond to them, which reduces their voice. Their only opportunity
to express their concerns may arise at a public meeting held long after negotiations
have been underway.
Neighbors are far less likely than developers to have experience and familiarity
with the workings of the permitting system.321 They often will need to find legal
representation on short notice. This challenge is magnified by the fact that retaining
counsel may entail going door to door to collect the necessary funds from a large
number of people who may not yet be focusing on the issue and may not have the
means to contribute. Neighbors may not be able to find capable lawyers willing to
represent them, given that the most experienced and skilled land use lawyers in town
may already work for the parties that provide ongoing business.
319 See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 218, at 595 (“Forcing interest groups to pay a fair
charge for the benefits they receive is an effective way to curb minoritarian rent-seeking.”).
320 See, e.g., River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 23 F.3d 164, 165 (7th Cir. 1994)
(discussing community members delaying a zoning application).
321 Of course, many neighborhoods have organized homeowners’ associations that may
have developed skill and experience in these settings. However, neighborhood opponents are
less likely to have this type of experience than are applicants proposing new projects.
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Moreover, while the collective loss to a group of neighbors may be large, the
damage to each individual neighbor may not be. Some neighbors may decide—quite
reasonably—that their particular losses are small enough that it is not worth the
effort to put up a fight, while others may choose to free-ride on the fight that their
neighbors will make (and pay for) on their behalf.322 Different neighbors thus may
contribute different amounts of time, energy, and money, reflecting their level of
concern about the proposal, their resources, and their recognition that others will
raise their arguments for them. The homeowners’ association located nearest to the
proposed project may be small, disorganized, and starved for leadership, while
another better equipped homeowners’ association may be located further away and
thus be less concerned about the proposal.
This collective action problem should not be underestimated. The first time a
group of neighbors learns of a new development project may be when a “variance”
or “rezoning” sign is posted on the property. That posting typically occurs only a
few weeks before a public hearing, long after the applicant and the permitting
agency have reached a tentative resolution of their disagreements.323 Even if the
neighbors become aware of some clues earlier, perhaps by observing surveyors or
contractors on the site, they are unlikely to know exactly what type of development
is imminent, and they often do not understand how to gather the requisite informa-
tion. Sophisticated neighbors may know which building official to call, but less
experienced observers may simply live with the uneasy feeling that “something is
up” without knowing exactly what that “something” is until it is nearly too late.
Once the neighbors ascertain that an applicant has submitted a proposal, they need
to decide whether and how to act. Potential respondents will not know if their neigh-
bors are aware of the proposal or if they all share the same objections. Someone will
need to take the lead, notify neighbors, rally support, persuade people to speak at public
meetings, and pass the hat if they need legal representation. They may have to under-
take all of this activity within a brief two- or three-week period. Some developers
time their applications to reduce the likelihood of objection, perhaps by seeking
permits at times of year when they know the neighbors are likely to be preoccupied
or away, such as during the summer or the Thanksgiving and Christmas seasons.
Because of these factors, some applicants may receive permits because they
deserve to, while others may obtain the necessary approvals simply because poten-
tial objectors are unable to organize and respond in a timely fashion.324 This is
particularly true if the neighbors lack the education, legal sophistication, financial
wherewithal, and access to government that increase the odds of their opposition
322 See Levinson, supra note 86, at 374–76.
323 See, e.g., NASHVILLE & DAVIDSON CTY., TENN., MUN. CODE § 17.40.730(B) (2017)
(“Public notice signs shall be installed on affected properties no less than twenty-one days
prior to an established public hearing date” with regard to all zoning matters.).
324 Cf. River Park, 23 F.3d at 165 (discussing stalling tactics by community members re-
sulting in the zoning application expiring).
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succeeding. Neighbors that fail to raise objections at the administrative level may
be precluded from raising them later in court. Thus, even if courts follow the
recommendations of this Article and recognize reverse exaction claims, it is likely
that the number of exaction claims brought by applicants will remain much larger
than the number of reverse exaction claims raised by diffuse collections of neigh-
bors. Though it is reasonable and fair for courts to recognize reverse exaction claims,
parties who bring those claims will face even more of an uphill battle than applicants
who bring traditional exaction claims. There will be fewer reverse exaction claims,
and those claims will be less likely to succeed.
Substantively, courts considering reverse exaction claims may be biased against
them, at least as compared to traditional exaction claims. The plaintiff in a tradi-
tional exaction claim often believes its ability to use its property has been signifi-
cantly impaired.325 The Nollans could not replace their small house with a larger
one;326 the Dolans could not expand their plumbing supply store;327 and Koontz
could not commence construction on his unimproved land.328 By contrast, neighbors
bringing reverse exaction claims may each be suffering modest diminutions to the
value of their property arising from annoyances, not prohibitions on the use or reuse
of their land. While the collective impairment of their property rights may be huge,
those losses are often spread unevenly across a large and diverse group of neighbors.
Residents may suffer different losses than business owners. The closest neighbors
may endure worse intrusions than those located further away.
Because the Court has applied a “diminution in value” test in other areas of
regulatory takings law, lower courts may be tempted to analyze reverse exaction
cases in a similar way. Courts taking this approach may conclude that, because each
individual neighbor’s loss does not cross a particular threshold, no neighbor has a
cognizable takings claims or each of them has a very weak claim. This approach would
be entirely inappropriate, because the Court has stated very clearly that exaction
cases are different from “diminution in value” claims raised under the Pennsylvania
Coal329 and Penn Central330 tests.331 However, many judges hear regulatory takings
claims only rarely, and lawyers bringing reverse exaction claims will need to take
great care to educate courts about the distinctions between exaction claims—
including the reverse exaction claims described here—and other regulatory takings
325 See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 827–31 (1987).
326 Id.
327 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 379–83 (1994).
328 Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2591–93 (2013).
329 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
330 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
331 See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005); see also City of Monterey v.
Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 703 (1999) (noting, in a case that did not involve exactions,
“We believe . . . that the rough-proportionality test of Dolan is inapposite to a case such as
this one.”).
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claims.332 The Supreme Court has been quite clear that exaction cases raise due-
process-like issues under which a claimant can prevail even if it suffers only a
modest loss, and the same should hold true for reverse exaction claims. The diminu-
tion in value test simply is beside the point in an exaction case.
Another way in which reverse exaction claims differ from traditional exaction
claims is that reverse exaction claims must address the threshold question of whether
the plaintiff has lost a property interest.333 In a traditional exaction claim, the ap-
plicant seeks a permit which is granted with conditions attached, and the sole
question is whether those conditions are sufficiently linked to a problem the appli-
cant will create.334 Moreover, Koontz acknowledges a right of action even for
claimants that have rejected the exaction and lost no property at all.335 Koontz pre-
vailed because the government “impermissibly burden[ed] the right not to have
property taken without just compensation.”336
Reverse exaction claimants, by contrast, would need to suffer the loss of a
constitutionally protected property interest. This asymmetry reflects the fact that a
reverse exaction is a type of claim and not actually a type of exaction, as noted
above, since the neighbors have not technically suffered an exaction. If anything,
this distinction strengthens the argument that courts should recognize reverse exac-
tion claims, given that these claimants must have lost an interest in property while
claimants raising traditional exaction claims may not have. If the Takings Clause
protects Koontz, who gave up no property,337 it certainly should protect a property
owner forced to become servient to an easement for floodwater runoff.
In the example in this Article’s Abstract, a developer that wishes to build a
shopping center may find the government’s approval conditioned on its provision
of a right-turn lane. If it provides the lane, it might later bring an exaction claim
under Nollan and Dolan; if it rejects the exaction, it might bring a claim under
Koontz. Suppose instead that the relevant agency grants the permit on condition that
the developer installs a sign that reads, “Increased Congestion Ahead.” Neighbors
332 See Krier & Sterk, supra note 73, at 56 (“In many cases . . . landowners lose not
because of questions about the scope of the per se rule, but because courts do not know or
understand Supreme Court doctrine, or willfully ignore it or interpret it as having significant
play in the joints.” (footnote omitted)).
333 See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; see also Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2597–98 (discussing
possible state law claims).
334 Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
335 133 S. Ct. at 2596.
336 Id. This raises the question of whether an applicant that rejects a proposed exaction—
regardless of whatever rights it might have under Koontz—suffers a Fifth Amendment taking
at all. See John D. Echeverria, Takings and Errors, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1047, 1087 (2000) (“If
the validity of the government action is a precondition for a legitimate takings claim, then
an erroneous government action precludes a finding of a taking.” (footnote omitted)).
337 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2596.
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inconvenienced by this traffic may wish to bring a reverse exaction claim but would
face the threshold question of whether they enjoy a property right in the lower level
of traffic that existed before the applicant applied for a permit.338 If they do not, then
the Fifth Amendment is not implicated, though the neighbors still may be able to
bring some other type of claim.
6. Concerns Recognition of Reverse Exaction Claims Might Raise and Responses
to Those Concerns
One argument against judicial recognition of reverse exaction claims is that it
will increase the quantity of land use litigation, thereby adding to the burden facing
courts already laboring under heavy caseloads. This is a trivial objection: if the
Takings Clause protects neighbors against this type of government activity, then
those neighbors are constitutionally entitled to a remedy, even if enforcing these
rights consumes precious judicial time.339 One might argue that expending judicial
resources to protect rights of such modest value is foolhardy and that these claimants
are squandering public funds tilting at windmills. Of course, the Court has not taken
that position in past cases in which it protected the property rights of claimants: a
lower court eventually awarded Jean Loretto one dollar,340 while the First English
Evangelical Church of Glendale received nothing at all in the end.341 And there is
no reason to reject reverse exaction claims that are worth significant amounts just
because other reverse exaction claims may not be.
Moreover, this Article has argued that if the Court recognizes traditional ex-
action claims, then it has no choice but to recognize reverse exaction claims. The
two types of cases are reflections of each other, and the property rights of neighbors
are no less worthy of constitutional protection than the property rights of permit
applicants. Exaction claims by their nature are cases in which adjacent land uses are
incompatible with each other, and the question of which claim is the “traditional”
one and which is its “reverse” indicates little more than which party opted to act
first.342 Had another business owner in Tigard, Oregon, applied for an expansion
338 See supra notes 292–95 and accompanying text.
339 See generally U.S. CONST. amend. V.
340 A $1 Cable Fee for TV Hookup Upheld by State, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1983, at B3
(noting that the cable wiring actually increased the value of Loretto’s building).
341 First English Evangelical Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 258 Cal. Rptr.
893 (Ct. App. 1989) (finding no taking on remand from Supreme Court and therefore award-
ing no compensation); see also Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234 (1997) (protecting certain
interests against escheat even though they earned less than $100 in the preceding year).
342 See Sun & Daniels, supra note 84, at 334 (“Underlying social norms and existing legal
rights can shape the way that we view attribution of externalities, but externality campaigns
exploiting particular externalities can also shape who we view as wrongdoers in a particular
situation—and, in turn, lay the groundwork for redefining underlying rights and responsi-
bilities.” (footnote omitted)).
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permit that the city granted, the Dolans easily could have been plaintiffs in a reverse
exaction claim defending their property rights against encroachment by their aggres-
sive and speedier neighbor.343
To the extent the proposals offered here do lead to an increase in the number of
claims, that additional litigation is initiated by neighbors bringing suits that may
have merit. It makes no more sense to reject reverse exaction claims because they
lead to litigation than it makes to reject traditional exaction claims because they lead
to litigation. The only difference between the two claims is the identity of the
plaintiff. If critics worry that assessing the “essential nexus” and “rough proportional-
ity” of a reverse exaction claim will be difficult, fact-intensive tasks, the fault lies
not in this Article’s proposals but rather in the standards the Court created in Nollan
and Dolan.344
Permit applicants and their lawyers may worry that judicial recognition of
reverse exaction claims will deter land use agencies, fearing litigation, from granting
permits they otherwise might have granted or will encourage them to exact more
than they formerly would have. Government bodies and their lawyers may worry that
those bodies will end up as defendants no matter what they decide, since they are now
subject to claims from neighbors and not just from applicants.345 Both of these fears
may be warranted, but they also demonstrate that Nollan and Dolan favor one side
without justification. This Article’s goal is not to praise or condemn the rules of those
cases but rather to ensure that they are applied evenhandedly. If they have problem-
atically led to too much litigation, the solution is to revisit those cases and not to
strip an arbitrarily chosen half of the possible plaintiffs of their cause of action.346
Recall also that neighbors already enjoy the ability to bring nuisance claims
against their neighbors, just as Boomer did.347 Recognition of reverse exaction
claims might lead to an increase in litigation, or it might simply mean that neighbors
343 In such a claim, the Dolans might have argued that the conditions the city attached to
the other business owner’s permit were insufficient to offset the negative effects of that
owner’s expansion on the Dolans’ property rights. As a result, the Dolans would argue, the
city’s approval amounted to an unconstitutional reverse exaction of their own property rights,
deserving of compensation. If a court agreed, the Dolans would receive compensation from
the city, and the city would seek recompense from the other business, which effectively
received something belonging to the public for nothing and is now being held to account. See
supra Section III.B.1–4.
344 An increase in lawsuits might also serve to reduce respect for administrative decisions.
See generally Timothy M. Mulvaney, Legislative Exactions and Progressive Property, 40
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 137, 141 (2016) (“[M]arginalizing administrative acts as regularly
interfering with constitutionally protected property interests in the exactions context could
have spillover effects . . . .”).
345 See supra Section III.B.1–2.
346 If a single change in land use negatively affects multiple neighbors, as is likely to hap-
pen at least some of the time, then it is entirely possible that more than half of the potential
plaintiffs will be those with reverse exaction claims.
347 See supra notes 269–78 and accompanying text.
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who bring nuisance claims against applicants will also bring reverse exaction claims
against the government agency that allowed the applicant to proceed without suf-
ficiently mitigating its externalities. Note, though, that judicial recognition of reverse
exaction claims is designed in part to affect government agencies long before the
project advances, by encouraging them to exact appropriately. The mere possibility
that a neighbor might later bring a reverse exaction claim should push government
bodies, and perhaps even applicants themselves, in a direction that makes such a
claim less likely.
A larger concern is whether government bodies, particularly at the local level,
will be whipsawed by this Article’s proposals. Officials may fear that judicial recog-
nition of reverse exactions claims will place local governments in a “damned if you
do, damned if you don’t” position. Lawsuits inevitably will arise every time the
government body proposes an exaction rather than denying or approving the request
unconditionally. Whichever way the final exaction tilts, the unhappier party will sue.
It is even possible that both parties might bring claims, with each believing that it
drew the short straw.
There are two responses to this concern. First, as noted earlier, there is not a
unique, correct manner of addressing every possible externality that a proposed
change in land use may create, and land use bodies will still enjoy wide latitude to
respond to each request.348 Only the most egregious under-exactions will lead to
successful reverse exaction claims, just as only the most overreaching exactions
result in compensation under Nollan and Dolan. There may be more claims, but this
does not imply that there will be more successful claims.
Of course, it is costly to defend against claims even when those claims lack
merit. But jurisdictions will become cognizant of this problem and will seek to
propose exactions that are more balanced and thus less likely to encourage litigation
by either side. Moreover, the knowledge that courts allow reverse exaction claims
might lead to an increase in direct and early negotiations between the neighbors,
who enjoy this newly recognized tool, and the applicant, which fears indirect
liability if a reverse exaction claim later succeeds. Getting neighbors involved in the
permitting process sooner would be a beneficial outcome rather than a problem and
is a strong argument for recognizing reverse exaction claims.
Additionally, the fact that some exactions will lead to lawsuits by unhappy
neighbors does not mean that all exactions will. Neighbors will enjoy a previously
unrecognized cause of action, but they will not always prevail, and they usually will
not bring claims. Land use litigation is a costly and unpleasant process, and plaintiffs
have to acknowledge the overwhelming likelihood that they will not prevail in the end.
These expenses and this unpleasantness act as a natural screening device, theoreti-
cally weeding out less worthy claims. Experienced and capable lawyers will quickly
learn which claims are most likely to succeed and, one hopes, will discourage
348 See supra Section III.B.1–2.
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neighbors whose claims are less viable. Moreover, as noted above, there are built-in
reasons why there are likely to be fewer reverse exaction claims than exaction claims.349
Trial courts will have to use their judgment, including at the motion stage of any
litigation that results, just as they currently must whenever an unhappy applicant
brings a claim under Nollan and Dolan. There may be a small increase in claims and
an even smaller increase in successful claims, but that is the direct consequence of
re-examining a rule that already encourages litigation and making it more balanced.
Critics of this Article’s proposal may see its analysis of traditional exactions as
naively overlooking government use of exactions as revenue-raising devices. In this
view, governments that impose exactions may intentionally fail to act as even-
handed mediators. Those who share this belief likely agree with the Koontz Court’s
view of government agencies as sometimes extorting funds from property owners
who seek permits.350 Even if this criticism is accurate, it has little impact on this
Article’s proposed judicial recognition of reverse exaction claims. The existing
nexus and proportionality standards applicable to traditional exaction claims already
address the problem of over-exactions,351 and governments that attempt to exact still
must either meet those standards or pay compensation to unhappy applicants willing
to litigate.352 Judicial recognition of reverse exactions would change none of that
law; it simply would make it more reciprocal, thereby addressing cases in which
government agencies go too far in the opposite direction. Recognition of reverse
exactions will have no impact on the remedy available to applicants, nor will it
reward neighbors in cases in which the government exacts too much. The sole func-
tion of a reverse exaction claim is to protect neighbors when the government does
not exact enough.
The most significant and desirable impact of judicial recognition of reverse
exaction claims is likely to be the effect it has on government agencies early in the
permitting process. Government awareness of the remote possibility of a reverse
exaction claim will inform its actions as it steers its way through negotiations with
permit applicants and, possibly, decides to propose an exaction. The fear of litiga-
tion by neighbors, and not just by applicants, may lead to more equitable exactions.
These more impartial exactions, in the end, are the ones that are least likely to result
in a successful claim by any party. These are the outcomes government agencies
should strive for, and if judicial recognition of reverse exaction claims leads to fairer
government action, then that recognition has served its primary purpose and will
prove to be a highly desirable development.
None of this is meant to suggest that there is only one correct approach to using
exactions to mitigate the effects of a proposed change in the use of land. Government
349 See supra Section III.B.5.
350 See supra notes 114–27 and accompanying text.
351 See supra Part I.
352 See supra Part I.
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agencies need not guess at the single unique solution that a court will later find to
be defensible against legal claims from any direction. There are countless ways a
given land use agency could respond to a request from an applicant that might merit
an exaction, including approving or denying the request unconditionally or imposing
any number or combination of conditions, and there are numerous ways to internal-
ize the externalities that an applicant’s request creates. A reverse exaction claimant,
like a more traditional claimant, will not win simply because the government did not
select the option that claimant most prefers.
The government must enjoy considerable leeway in these fact-specific settings.353
Existing exaction doctrine already provides that leeway in claims by applicants, and
the reverse exaction standards proposed here mirror that case law and provide similar
flexibility in claims raised by neighbors.354 In Justice Holmes’s words, “some play
must be allowed to the joints if the machine is to work.”355 Courts must recognize
that land use professionals enjoy—and need—the latitude to devise local solutions to
local problems free of incessant meddling by courts. The goal of this Article’s pro-
posal is not to guarantee that governments are sued no matter what they do. Rather, the
goal is to place neighbors on the same footing as permit applicants by requiring local
land use bodies to treat their concerns and their property interests with equal concern
and gravity.356 And the government always retains the ability either to grant or to deny
the permit unconditionally, at which point the law of exactions becomes irrelevant.
Note that it is possible, on a given set of facts, for a government entity to face
claims from both the applicant and the neighbors. This is unlikely, given that these
types of claims usually fail: it will be extremely rare for a single set of facts to per-
suade both parties that they have a chance of prevailing. It is even possible, though
exceedingly unlikely, that both parties might succeed in their claims against the gov-
ernment, given that each has to prove only one of the two prongs of the exaction
test.357 Thus, an exaction claimant theoretically might be able to prove the lack of
an essential nexus on the same facts on which a reverse exaction claimant shows a
lack of rough proportionality. This possibility is remote, and if a government body
353 See Davidson, supra note 15, at 484–86 (discussing the importance of expectations of
flexibility as well as expectations of stability).
354 See supra Section III.B.1–2.
355 Tyson & Bro.-United Theatre Ticket Offices, Inc. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 446 (1927)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
356 Cf. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 848 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(“In this case . . . the State has sought to protect public expectations of access from disruption
by private land use. The State’s exercise of its police power for this purpose deserves no less
deference than any other measure designed to further the welfare of state citizens.”). Justice
Brennan’s dissent, of course, supports the argument of the defendant-respondent in Nollan, the
California Coastal Commission. This Article, by contrast, views the dispute from the perspec-
tive of the members of the public whose interests that Commission was created to safeguard.
357 See supra Part III.
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proposes an exaction this flawed, then it deserves to lose both claims. If it accom-
plishes nothing else, judicial recognition of reverse exactions should at least induce
government agencies to propose exactions that are better than this.
Another concern is that exactions might come to be viewed as a fee-for-services
plan by which permit applicants can purchase the right to impose on their neighbors
by paying a fee—in effect, privately condemning land. Moreover, the size of that fee
is subject to judicial review. Justice Kagan seems to hint at this concern in her
Koontz dissent, where she notes that, “[t]he Federal Constitution thus will decide
whether one town is overcharging for sewage, or another is setting the price to sell
liquor too high. And the flexibility of state and local governments to take the most
routine actions to enhance their communities will diminish accordingly.”358 To the
extent this is a problem, though, it lies within the holdings in Nollan and Dolan,
which import due-process standards into the takings inquiry.359 This Article’s pro-
posals merely seek to make that inquiry more reciprocal.
One last concern this Article’s proposals might raise is that, even if courts
recognize reverse exaction claims, the deck will be stacked against the success of
these claims to a much greater degree than it is for traditional exaction claimants.
The traditional exaction claimant is a property owner that proposes a considerable
change in its use of its land.360 If that proposal is rejected or saddled with substantial
exactions, that owner may lose significantly or, more likely, may be unable to
recognize significant gains to which it believes it is entitled.361 The claimant may
prevail, as Koontz did, by persuading a court that compliance will be very costly,
or at least too costly when considered in light of the possible damage the new de-
velopment could create.362
By contrast, reverse exaction claimants will often be large and diverse collections
of neighbors, each suffering only modest impairment of their property rights. Those
collective losses may be huge and may even exceed the total gains the applicant will
enjoy if it receives its requested permit. But each individual neighbor faces far
smaller injuries. Courts could look at each of these neighbors and see those smaller
individualized losses as being spread across the community and thus may reject
these reverse exaction claims. The concern, then, is that a court might look at each
neighbor’s relatively low loss and decide that each such loss is too trivial to merit
any sort of constitutional protection, notwithstanding the large collective harm.
358 Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2607 (2013) (Kagan,
J., dissenting).
359 Cf. Richard M. Bird, Why We Should but Don’t Pay the Right Prices for Urban Infra-
structure (Rotman Sch. of Mgmt., Working Paper No. 2909873, 2017), https://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2909873 (arguing for a greater reliance on user fees).
360 See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 379–83 (1994).
361 Id.
362 See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2594–2603.
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If a court treats reverse exaction claims as mirror images of standard exaction
claims, as it should, then this concern is unwarranted. Unlike exaction claims,
straightforward regulatory takings claims that courts analyze under the Penn Central
standard focus, at least in part, on the magnitude of the loss that a claimant suffers.363
Courts facing these claims are supposed to examine the diminution in the value of the
plaintiff’s property.364 They are also required to decide whether the claimant’s rea-
sonable investment-backed expectations have been constitutionally impaired, an in-
quiry that examines what the owner thought it was acquiring, whether those beliefs
were reasonable, and how significantly those property rights have been harmed.365
Thus, traditional regulatory claims succeed, at least in part, based on how much
value the claimant has lost.366
This is not true of exaction claims. The Nollan standard expressly asks due-
process-like questions: Is there a legitimate state interest?367 Does the government’s
proposal substantially advance that interest?368 Nollan, then, focuses on rights and
not on value, which means that a claimant with a small monetary loss can meet this
standard and prevail.369 If a court recognizes that reverse exaction claims raise only
questions of nexus and proportionality, and if it applies those standards correctly,
then reverse exaction claimants should be no better or worse off than traditional
exaction claimants, and even neighbors with slight losses will sometimes be able to
meet the reverse exaction standard. This is true even though each reverse exaction
claimant’s damages might be relatively small. In fact, Koontz prevailed in a direct
exaction claim without evidently suffering any loss at all from the proposed exac-
tion.370 If courts are willing to rule in favor of direct exaction claimants who have
suffered no apparent loss, then they should be willing to rule in favor of reverse
exaction claimants who have suffered modest but measurable damages and should
then award them compensation that is just.
363 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978).
364 Id.; see also Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
365 Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 124–27.
366 Id. at 124; see also Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 413.
367 Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831–37 (1987).
368 See id.; see also supra notes 29–30, 174 and accompanying text.
369 Dolan, to some degree, does raise questions of dollars and cents by asking whether an
exaction is roughly proportional to the problem it has been formulated to solve. But the rough
proportionality test, by its very nature, adjusts for size: if a proposal will cause huge
externalities, then a huge exaction may be roughly proportional and thus constitutional, but
for smaller externalities, the exaction must be reduced in scale, a point the Dolan Court
stated expressly. 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994). The same standard would apply to reverse exac-
tion claims, and neighbors who suffer only modest losses from an applicant’s project can be
made constitutionally whole with correspondingly modest exactions. And, of course, a
reverse exaction claimant can prevail by meeting just one of these two prongs. See supra
notes 164–66 and accompanying text.
370 Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2596 (2013).
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7. Should the Neighbors Be Entitled to Any of the Applicant’s Increase in Value?
This Article will close by raising one last question that gets to the heart of the
distinction between property and liability rules. A well-calculated exaction should
internalize the additional costs that an applicant’s proposal imposes on the commu-
nity at large.371 This Article began by suggesting that a developer that creates increases
in traffic might be required to dedicate land to widen the frontage road. From an
economic perspective, this example requires the applicant to internalize its costs, and
Dolan ensures that it not be required to do any more than that.372 But why should the
government not be allowed to demand more?
If the applicant needs lumber to construct its project, it pays a market price for
that lumber. Many parties profit by setting prices along the way, from the owner of the
timber property, to the laborer who fells the tree, to the mill that turns it into lumber,
to the trucker that hauls it to a retail store, to the retailer that sells it to the applicant.
At each step, private parties negotiate a price that presumably rewards each party that
helps to create the value of every two-by-four. If anyone along the way rejects a deal,
then their counterparty must up their offer or negotiate with a competitor until they can
strike a bargain. Surely we would not reward a developer that steals lumber from Home
Depot by allowing an administrative agency or jury to establish a reasonable price that
the developer must pay for the lumber. We would instead make the thief pay whatever
the retailer charges for that product, even if that price is unreasonably high.
With respect to the exaction, though, we do let the agency or jury set the price.
Unlike the supplier of lumber, which will turn down any sale price that does not
include some profit, the community is required to cap its exactions at the rough
proportionality standard.373 Any higher price violates the Constitution, whether paid
in property rights or dollars.374 Thus, every party that the developer deals with vol-
untarily during the course of improving its property is entitled to share in the gain
that the project will create, but the one party that is brought into the transaction
involuntarily—the community that is harmed against its wishes—enjoys none of this
profit.375 If the neighbor is entitled to reverse exaction compensation, it is entitled
371 See, e.g., APA Policy Guide on Impact Fees, AM. PLANNING ASS’N (Apr. 1997), https://
www.planning.org/policy/guides/adopted/impactfees.htm [https://perma.cc/YZJ5-M5UC]
(“Impact fees should only be utilized when a connection can be made between the impact of
new development and the need for new infrastructure to accommodate that development.”).
The APA recommends several “Impact Fee Standards,” including, “[t]he imposition of a fee
must be rationally linked (the ‘rational nexus’) to an impact created by a particular develop-
ment and the demonstrated need for related capital improvements pursuant to a capital
improvement plan and program.” Id.
372 512 U.S. at 391.
373 Id.
374 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2598–99.
375 See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 218, at 610 (“[E]xactions only cover the expenses
the surrounding community might incur following certain givings, but not the opportunity
cost to the community as a result of bestowing the benefit.”).
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only to whatever amount a jury decides is just. All profit goes to the developer—and
the developer would not proceed unless it expected to profit—while the neighbors
are required to participate in a forced sale at a price they have no hand in setting and
that restores them only to the status quo ante.
This is a classic illustration of courts applying a liability rule in a setting in which
a property rule might be more appropriate, as the earlier discussion of the Boomer
case highlighted.376 This Article will leave for another day possible remedies that
might treat the neighbors more fairly, or at least as fairly as everyone else who
participates in the process of developing the applicant’s property.377 Some might view
reverse exaction claims as treating neighbors more favorably than they deserve. The
point to note here, though, is that even neighbors who prevail on reverse exaction
claims have been restored only to the situation they enjoyed before an external party
disturbed them. They break even rather than losing, and they do so after participating
reluctantly in a slow, costly, and unpleasant process they did not initiate. They have
nothing to gain by bringing a reverse exaction claim; they merely have less to lose.
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that the property rights of the neighbors of permit ap-
plicants are as deserving of Fifth Amendment protection as the property rights of the
applicants themselves. Exactions, which are intended to be equalizing devices, can be
too intrusive, thereby harming the applicant, or not intrusive enough, thereby harming
the community. Because exactions are a balancing device and the government’s role
is to strike the correct balance, members of the public, like permit applicants, should
benefit from the Court’s essential nexus and rough proportionality standards.
As a result, courts should recognize reverse exaction claims. Courts adopting this
approach would allow neighbors of permit applicants to bring claims arguing that in-
adequate exactions imposed on those applicants have taken the property of the neigh-
bors. Reverse exaction claims, like traditional exaction claims, would be subject to the
Nollan378 and Dolan379 standards, and few neighbors would be likely to prevail. How-
ever, the knowledge by permitting bodies that neighbors might bring a claim would
encourage them to reach more evenhanded decisions when considering applications
for permits. This approach will restore needed fairness to permitting decisions and will
address more equitably a process that currently favors applicants over their neighbors.
376 See supra notes 269–78 and accompanying text.
377 See, e.g., Chen, supra note 255, at 33–38 (comparing Singapore’s approach to recap-
turing some of the gain brought about when the government grants discretionary permits with
that of the United States); id. at 36 (noting one lawmaker’s view that “it is perfectly
legitimate to require landowners to give back a portion of realizable gains to the State by way
of development charge when they benefit from the positive externalities arising from govern-
ment’s planning actions.”).
378 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
379 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
